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O'CONNOR'S CANONS: THE PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE SANDRA
DAY O'CONNOR
STEVEN H. HOBBSt
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor came to the Supreme Court at a
time of tremendous change in the legal profession. With the
development of commercial free-speech doctnne, lawyers were
permitted to advertise their services. Justice O'Connor vigorously
opposed this development because of the potential legal advertising
had for damaging the ethical standards of the profession. She
believed that lawyers, because of their privileged position in society,
had a igher moral duty to society as officers of the court. Moreover,
she asserted that ethical standards hould be established at the state
level and the Court should defer to the states in this regard Justice
O'Connor wrapped her professional ideals around the belief that our
majestic law, steeped in traditions of freedom, democracy, and
liberty, was to be maintained by lawyers with the highest commitment
to professional duty and a willingness to subserve their own financial
and personal interests to the needs of the clients. This article will
consider the constitutional jurisprudence of Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor in the arena ofprofessional responsibility with a focus on
how she expressed her ethical canons in light of First Amendment
doctrine as applied to commercial free speech. Her views are
immensely relevant o current discourse on professionalism
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INTRODUCTION
Much has been made of Justice O'Connor's role as a "swing"
Justice on matters of abortion rights, racial preferences, religion,
women's rights, and other matters.I Her efforts to change the Court's
position on the regulation of attorney conduct are seldom mentioned,
especially in the area of legal advertising and solicitation.2 She
1. Evan Thomas, Queen of the Center, NEWSWEEK (July 11, 2005), http://www.news
week.com/queen-center-121805; see also JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR (2005);
NANCY MAVEETY, JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: STRATEGIST ON THE SUPREME COURT
(1996); ANN CAREY MCFEATTERS, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE
(2005); Jeffrey Rosen, The O'Connor Court: America's Most Powerful Jurist N.Y. TIMES
(June 3, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/03/magazine/030CONNOR.html?pagewant
ed=all.
2. MCFEATTERS, supra note 1, at 191-92 ("A recurring theme that took on increasing
passion for her while on the Supreme Court was the state of the law and the importance of
turning out better, more ethical lawyers. In a speech at the dedication of the Alyne Queener
Massey Library at Vanderbilt Law School as early in her tenure on the bench as 1982, she said
law schools must not only teach students to be competent lawyers but also imbue them with
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vigorously rejected the findings of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,3
which opened the way for lawyer advertising and for what some say
was the deprofessionalization of the practice of law.4 In a line of
cases examining various aspects of lawyer free speech in the
commercial context, Justice O'Connor consistently dissented.5 In
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, Justice O'Connor noted:
In my judgment, however, fairly severe
constraints on attorney advertising can continue to
play an important role in preserving the legal
profession as a genuine profession. Whatever may be
the exactly appropriate scope of these restrictions at a
given time and place, this Court's recent decisions
reflect a myopic belief that "consumers" and thus our
Nation, will benefit from a constitutional theory that
refuses to recognize either the essence of
professionalism or its fragile and necessary
foundations .... In one way or another, time will
uncover the folly of this approach. I can only hope
that the Court will recognize the danger before it is
too late to effect a worthwhile cure.6
Justice O'Connor had her opportunity to start a cure with the
case of Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., where the Court upheld the
state's targeted-mailings rule that made it unethical to send targeted
mail to accident victims for a thirty-day period after the accident.
This case reflects her commitment to professionalism and her
opposition to the commercialization of the practice of law in a manner
that places the lawyer's personal interest ahead of not only the client's
interest but also society's interest. It also showcased her more
sense of professional responsibility. Despite the increase in the disciplining of lawyers by state
and federal courts, she said, more lawyers need training in 'moral responsibility."').
3. Bates v. State Bar ofAriz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
4. See William G. Hyland, Jr., Attorney Advertising and the Decline of the Legal
Profession, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 339 (2011); Saundra Saperstein & Al Kamen, Burger Assails
Lawyer Advertising: At ABA Meeting, ChiefJustice Cites Cases of 'Sheer Shysterism,'
WASH. POST, July 8, 1985, at Al.
5. See generally Peel v. Att'y Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91
(1990); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
6. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 491.
7. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995).
2015] 101
WILLAMETTELA WREVIEW
restrictive use of the commercial free-speech analysis established by
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v Public Service Commission
of New York, discussed below.8 Many other writings reflect her
thinking about professionalism, especially her seminal book, The
Majesty of the Law.9 Fundamentally, she considers the practice of
law to be grounded in the ideal of public service. For her, this not
only means doing pro bono work but also reflects an understanding
that as lawyers it is our task to preserve the fundamental values of our
constitutional democracy. Lawyers stand to defend justice, equality,
and due process for individual citizens, thereby ensuring that our
fundamental freedoms are preserved. Hence our ethical duties are
shaped by this public, professional commitment to utilizing our status,
prestige, and power to honor and defend the law. My intent is to
consider this ethical jurisprudence and to examine its foundations.
The first section will examine the biographical background and
writings of Justice O'Connor to consider the intellectual personal
basis for her perspective on professionalism as related to lawyer
advertising and solicitation. I will consider how her background,
mentors, and judicial philosophy may have influenced her thinking in
this area. The second section of this article will examine the
development of First Amendment doctrine as applied to professionals
seeking to obtain clients. The major focus is on both how lawyers
were seeking new ways to connect to clients and how the Supreme
Court was expanding the First Amendment analysis beyond
nonpolitical speech. The Bates case permitted lawyers to advertise
and challenged the more traditional, historical views about the legal
profession.
The third section will consider how the free-speech analysis in
Bates created significant doctrinal challenges. The opinions in Bates
reflect the difficulty of developing a workable analysis for reviewing
state-imposed restrictions on lawyer advertising and business
solicitation. This section will examine the advertising and solicitation
cases that followed Bates and the different lines of reasoning pursued
by various Justices of the Supreme Court. From the dialogue among
the Justices one will observe three distinct challenges to obtaining
analytical clarity on the subject: (1) how a consideration of
8. See infra notes 221-226 and accompanying discussion infra Part W.A.
9. See SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A




viewpoints on the First Amendment shapes the discourse; (2) how a
recognition that subjective facts can shade any analysis; and (3) how a
presentation on varying philosophical perspectives about
professionalism and the role of states in regulating attorneys' ethical
conduct influences the Justices' perspectives.
The fourth section will briefly review further case developments
in the commercial free-speech area. These cases provide the
background against which Justice O'Connor sketches her own
perspectives on the subject.
The fifth section will review the commercial free-speech cases
involving legal ethics decided by the Supreme Court from the time of
Justice O'Connor's appointment until the case of Florida Bar v. Went
Forlt, Inc. (1981 to 1995).10 Here, we will see how Justice O'Connor
grappled with the ever-widening commercial approach to practicing
law. Writing generally in dissenting opinions, Justice O'Connor
articulated a more conservative reading of First Amendment doctrine
in commercial speech, while expressing a commitment to an
aspiration for high professional values. Justice O'Connor's approach
also reflected her sense that the regulation of lawyers should be left to
the states and the Court should defer to the states' judgment about
these matters.
The sixth section will examine Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion in Floida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. It will highlight the
continuing tension in the application of the Court's commercial free-
speech doctrines. The analytical debate among the Justices in this
case again reflects the doctrinal challenges of creating a sensible
approach to reviewing regulations in this area. And finally, I will
offer some concluding observations about the struggle for doctrinal
clarity in free-speech cases involving lawyer advertising and
solicitation. Of particular concern are the ever-evolving methods of
reaching out to potential clients in the digital age and the continuation
of the discourse on the tension between considering the practice of
law as a profession infused with a public purpose or a business like
any other, free to market its services in truthful, nondeceptive
modalities.
I. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CANONS OF PROFESSIONALISM
To understand Justice O'Connor's commitment to professional-
10. WentForl4 at 635.
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ism one needs to follow the tracks she made in this regard. Justice
O'Connor herself has written extensively on the topic of
professionalism, and examining these works provides an
understanding of where she is coming from." Of course, the heart of
the professional ideal is a commitment to excellence in all that she
does. These are lessons that she learned growing up on the Lazy B
Ranch in Arizona:
The value system we learned was simple and
unsophisticated and the product of necessity. What
counted was competence and the ability to do
whatever was required to maintain the ranch operation
in good working order-the livestock, the equipment,
the buildings, wells, fences, and vehicles. Verbal
skills were less important than the ability to know and
understand how things work in the physical world.
Personal qualities of honesty, dependability,
competence, and good humor were valued most.
These qualities were evident in most of the people
who lived and worked at the Lazy B through the
years. 12
Others have commented on how her early life on the family
ranch in Arizona taught the ethic of hard work and the value of care,
11. See generally Sandra Day O'Connor, Courthouse Dedication: Justice O'Connor
Reflects on Arizona's Judiciary, 43 ARIz. L. REV. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Courthouse
Dedication]; Sandra Day O'Connor, Legal Education and Social Responsibility, 53 FORDHAM
L. REV. 659 (1985) [hereinafter Legal Education]; Sandra Day O'Connor, Meeting the
Demand for Pro Bono Services, 2 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Meeting the
Demand]; Sandra Day O'Connor, Professional Competence and Social Responsibility:
Fulfilling the Vanderbilt Vision, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Professional
Competence]; Sandra Day O'Connor, Professionalism, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 5 (1998)
(demonstrating the many times Justice O'Connor has shown professionalism); Sandra Day
O'Connor, Professionalism, 78 OR. L. REv. 385 (1999); Sandra Day O'Connor,
Professionalism: Remarks at the Dedication of the University of Oklahoma's Law School
Building and Library, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 197 (2002) [hereinafter Professionalism: Remarks];
Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks of Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice, Supreme Court
of the United States, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 383 (1996); Sandra Day O'Connor, Speech:
Celli Award Ceremony and Luncheon: ABA Annual Meeting, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 715 (1998)
[hereinafter Celli].
12. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR & H. ALAN DAY, LAZY B: GROWING UP ON A CATrLE
RANCH IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 315 (2002).
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especially important in raising livestock.'3 Early on she demonstrated
her intellectual prowess with her academic successes, especially at
Stanford Law School.14 Justice O'Connor graduated without a job
placement because of her gender. Nonetheless, she found legal work
suitable to her talents first as an assistant district attorney and later
when she set up her own law firm.15 This is just one example of her
deep commitment to succeeding in spite of the obstacles.'6
Justice O'Connor's vision of professionalism is firmly grounded
in her love and reverence for the law as an organizing institution of
our society. The title of her book, The Majesty of the Law, clearly
declares her respect for the law.'7 The book's title is derived from the
sculptured fresco that adorned the wall above her seat on the Supreme
Court bench.'8  In foregrounding the centrality of the law and
suggesting why it is majestic, she exclaimed: The law "is an essential
safeguard of the liberties and rights of the people. It allows for the
defense of human rights and the protection of innocence. It embodies
the hope that impartial judges will impart wisdom and fairness when
they decide the cases that come before them."'9
For Justice O'Connor, the law stands as a bulwark on behalf of
the people over and against whatever forces might threaten basic
freedoms; thus the use of the words "safeguard," "defense," and
13. See BISKUPIC, supra note 1, at 19 ("Whatever else might be said of the justice's
ranch life and school days, they certainly steeled her for other challenges. Said brother Alan,
'Since she was a little girl, she was never afraid of hard work and never afraid of a challenge.
She had gone through life, instead of fighting those things or getting worn out, allowing those
things to take her places that other people wouldn't go."').
14. See McFEATTERS, supra note 1, at 43-44 (noting that Justice O'Connor graduated
magna cum laude from Stanford undergraduate and was third in her class at Stanford Law
School).
15. Courthouse Dedication, supra note 11, at 1.
16. See McFEATrERS, supra note 1, at 47 ("When I applied to the Arizona Attorney
General's Office for work, they didn't have a place for me. I persisted, however, got a
temporary job, and quickly rose all the way to the bottom of the totem pole at the Attorney
General's Office. As was normal for a beginner, I got the least desirable assignments. But that
was all right, because I managed to take away from these rather humble professional
beginnings some valuable lessons. I learned, for example, the habit of always doing the best I
could with every task, no matter how unimportant it might seem at the time. Such present
habits can breed future success.").
17. See O'CONNOR, MAJESTY, supra note 9, at xvii ("My hope is that the historical
themes in this book, and the reflections expressed here, will help the reader better understand
our own system, and also why and how the Rule of Law offers the world its best hope for the
future.").




"protection." 20 No doubt she would agree with the admonition the
Harvard president gives the graduates of Harvard Law School at
commencement when conferring the law degree with the statement,
"You are ready to aid in the shaping of and application of those wise
restraints that make men free."2 Hence, she frames her professional
identity in a manner that serves the preservation of the law in order to
protect the people and our society.2 2
Her book provides the reasoning behind this "majesty of the law
framework."2 3 In explicating the historical context of our systems of
government and in describing how our founding documents came to
be, she highlights the principles of individual liberty within a
democratic, representative government constructed with a central
government operating in tandem with state governments.24 From her
seat on the bench, Justice O'Connor posits the role of the Court as
"striking precisely the right balance among the competing ideals of
law, freedom, and justice."25 The Court is called upon to consider a
broad range of issues involving basic rights under the Constitution,
the interpretation of legislative and regulatory enactments (both state
and federal), criminal and civil rights, and issues involving
"Federalism and separation of powers."26
The theme of federalism runs throughout her description of the
development of our system, and she especially emphasizes the role
played by the states and the need to recognize a correlative power to
make law for the citizens of the states.2 7 In her book she reviews how
important it was for the Framers to preserve the role of state
20. Id. at 242-43.
21. Rebecca Liao, Those Wise Restraints that Make Men Free: Legal Reform with
Chinese Characteristics, ALEPH MAG (May 2, 2011), http://thealephmag.com/2011/05/02/
those-wise-restraints-that-make-men-free/; see also O'CONNOR, MAJESTY, supra note 9, at
258.
22. O'Connor, Courthouse Dedication, supra note 11, at 7 (noting the importance of
what occurs inside the courthouse at the dedication of a new federal courthouse in Phoenix).
23. See generally SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, OUT OF ORDER: STORIES FROM THE
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT (2013) (continuing to reflect this notion of majesty in her
latest book).
24. O'CONNOR, MAJESTY, supra note 9, at 13.
25. Id at 15.
26. Id. at 13 ("These issues concern the balance of power between the states and the
federal government-a balance struck by the constitutional limits on state and the federal
power, the rules concerning preemption of state law by federal law, the doctrine of separation
of powers, and the Eleventh Amendment, which addresses the states' immunity from lawsuits
brought in federal court.").
27. Id at 56.
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governments.2 8 For Justice O'Connor, this remains a challenge for us
today in "preserving the role that independent state governments must
play in ensuring the success of that system of government in the new
century and beyond."2 9 Perhaps, this explains in part her reluctance to
overrule state efforts to regulate lawyers' conduct.3 0  The state is
obligated to protect the public from lawyers who may overreach or
use undue influence to promote their own economic interests.3 1  On
the positive side, the state also has the task of articulating the ideals of
professionalism. While the First Amendment has a place in
tempering the state's regulatory authority, the Court must generally
defer to the state's judgment in establishing ethical standards when
presented with a clear explication of the importance of the state's
interests.32 This is not inconsistent with her general judicial
philosophy of deferring to the legislative prerogatives of the states.3 3
In upholding the majesty of the law, the Court is also called upon
to respond in a deliberative manner to significant changes in society
that call for a re-examination of prior applications of the Constitution,
such as school desegregation.34 This is particularly reflected in her
chapter on the Bill of Rights,35 where she considers how important
the Amendments to the Constitution are in preserving our
fundamental liberties "against encroachment by the states as well as
by the federal government."3 6  For example, in discussing the First
Amendment, she details how, in setting up the Free Speech Clause,
28. Id ("For the Anti-Federalist, the autonomy of the states and the rights of the
individual were part and parcel of the same programs of democratic freedom. They saw in the
state legislatures democracy close to the source, the expression of the people themselves. One
of the important lessons of 1788 is that the independence of the states helps to protect one of
our most cherished liberties: the right to govern ourselves.").
29. Id. at 57.
30. See discussion infra Part V.A.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 325-328.
32. See infra note 84 (noting a state has an independent ability to define its own
standards of professionalism).
33. O'CONNOR, MAJESTY, supra note 9, at 56-57.
34. See id. at 14-15 ("[W]hen our agenda does change, the change most frequently is a
delayed response to changes in the nation's agenda. When Congress, the executive branch, or a
state lights a new fire by passing significant new legislation or taking bold new action, we are
inevitably summoned to attend to the blaze. Some litigants will ask us to fan the flames,
others will demand their extinguishment, and still others will request only that the fire not be
allowed to spread. Justice moves slowly (especially in a federal system where multiple courts
may be entitled to review the issue before we do), so the Court usually arrives on the scene
some years late. But once there, we must usually linger for a while.").
35. See id at 58-64.
36. Id at 59.
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"the primary concern was to protect political speech: specifically,
criticism of the government."37  Moreover, the constitutional
protection for free speech has expanded into areas of expression not
actually conceived of by the Framers. Ironically, while she notes the
Virginia Pharmacy case,3 9 she does not mention Bates or its progeny
and the mighty changes in the profession impacting the First
Amendment analysis of which she had an essential role.40
Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor places the most emphasis on the
original concept of free speech and expression in the context of
speakin out about the government, or other forms of political
speech. It is this element of our fundamental freedoms that makes
our democracy the envy of the world.4 2
A key to this review of her book, again, is the idea of the law's
magnificence. Studying the history of the Constitution, and
especially the Bill of Rights, reveals the central place these
documents have in our society.43 Justice O'Connor states, "It is part
of our American contribution to the notion of justice and freedom."4
Thus, there are basic civil and human rights that are protected from
government overreach and are not at the whim of majority rule.45 To
37. Id. at 61.
38. See id. ("One case, for instance questioned whether the First Amendment prohibits a
high school principal from keeping stories about pregnancy and birth control out of the school
paper. Another asked whether pharmacies must be permitted to advertise their prices for over-
the-counter drugs. We have even had to decide whether New Hampshire residents who
disagree with the state motto, "Live Free or Die," can use tape to cover that part of their
license plate.").
39. O'CONNOR, MAJESTY, supra note 9 at 61.
40. Id. at 228.
41. Id. at 250-54 (noting that an independent judiciary is key to a successful
democracy). Justice O'Connor further articulated her thoughts on the First Amendment:
The second principle I want to emphasize is the importance of a free
press. A judiciary that stands apart from other branches of government is
able to perform its function without fear of sanction. Likewise, a
responsive press free from government control is able to perform its
function of comment and criticism. Only an independent and vigorous
and responsible press permits democratic institutions to correct
themselves through the powerful forces of informed debate and public
opinion.
Id.
42. Id. at 257-58.
43. Id. at 58-64.
44. Id at 64.
45. Id at 59, 258.
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make these rights more than empty promises in old documents, there
must be a mechanism that ordinary citizens can use to defend their
rights.46 Justice O'Connor exclaimed, "In our system-and our
experience has proved its efficacy-it is the citizens themselves,
through the courts, who enforce their rights."4 7 So any person can
have a day in court against the government or anyone else who
infringes on that person's basic rights.48
However, there must be lawyers available to assist citizens in
protecting their rights. This is central to her ideals about
professionalism because it falls to lawyers to uphold the values of
freedom, justice, and liberty in courts of law.4 9 In Justice O'Connor's
words, "Lawyers possess the key to justice under a Rule of Law-the
key that opens the courtroom door."5 o Hence, lawyers, because of
their unique position, have a moral obligation to protect and honor the
law for the good of society.5 ' She emphatically expressed this
concept:
Although we must continue to train law students
to "think like lawyers" by teaching legal theory and
methods, we must not forget that questions of
professional responsibility cannot be resolved with the
same framework of analysis. After all, we as lawyers
and judges hold in our possession the keys to justice
under a rule of law. We hold these keys in trust for
those seeking to obtain justice within our legal
system. Lawyers who are sensitive to their role in
society will surely view their responsibility to the
public as transcending the purely technical skills of
their profession.52
46. Id at 258-59.
47. Id at 259.
48. Id ("They take their claims to the courts, and the courts decide whether the actions
of the executive branch have encroached upon some protected rights. The courts then have the
power to halt the official conduct that violates those rights, and to order relief for past injury.
Ready access to independent courts allows any citizen to press his or her claim.").
49. O'Connor, Professional Competence, supra note 11, at 7.
50. O'CONNOR, MAJESTY, supra note 9, at 229.
51. Id at 230.
52. See also O'CONNOR, MAJESTY, supra note 9, at 229. See generallyO'Connor, Legal
Education, supra note 11.
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As evident from this philosophical framework, she believes
fervently that lawyers have a moral and social responsibility to be
faithful to the moral values expressed in the law.53 The lawyer should
not only practice law in the technical sense of applying the law
correctly but also always consider the moral implications of their
work on behalf of the client. She states that, "A great lawyer is
always mindful of the moral and social as ects of the attorney's
power and position as an officer of the court." 
It is not readily obvious what she means by moral and social
responsibility, but this must be tied back to her idea about law's
majesty, specifically, the establishment of a system that upholds the
rule of law and protects the liberty interest of citizens. Our
democracy is not static, it continues to evolve and must do so in a
manner that harkens back to our original ideals of freedom, human
rights, and nonoppression by the government in its regulatory
powers. Justice O'Connor notes that the Supreme Court has
consistently tackled many of the social issues of the day that implicate
our fundamental freedoms, including, "the right to speak freely and
advocate for change, the right to worship as we please, and the
privilege of political participation."56 Moreover, great progress was
made in eliminating racial segregation and including all of our
citizens in the arc of liberty.5 7 All of this is in response to the notion
that the law in action should reflect the law as written in our organic
documents, and that takes a continuing inquiry into the meaning of
our rights and the institutions that are called to defend them.5 8 None
of this is even possible without first recognizing that we must
constantly ask, or inquire, about the nature of our democracy.59 Such
53. O'CONNOR, MAJESTY, supra note 9, at 226.
54. Id. at 226.
55. Id. at 266 ("But as the twentieth century progressed, evolving notions of individual
liberty, and efforts to balance that liberty with governmental power and the commands of
citizenship, became the heart ofjudicial decision making.").
56. Id.
57. Id. at 268.
58. Id at 268-69 ("Certainly, much work lies ahead to erase the severe damage and
distress caused by racial discrimination, and many questions remain unanswered about the
ultimate sweep of individual-rights decisions. But I believe that the hallmark of social change
in the last century was the Supreme Court's increasing protection of the individual and its
efforts to extend the benefits of American citizenship to every segment of society. So too, in
this new century, we will continue to ensure that individuals participate as equals in this
country.").
59. Id at 269.
[52:99110
O'CONNOR'S CANONS
inquiry into the nature of our democracy is the grounding of her stated
moral imperative.60
It is clear that Justice O'Connor believes lawyers, starting in law
school, must be trained in moral inquiry.61 While she does not
prescribe a single course of moral inquiry, she does note that the
current drama lawyers inflict on each other while seeking to win at all
costs has led to severe dissatisfaction with the practice of law.6 2 She
decries the warrior mentality of many lawyers who seek to destroy
their opponents without concern for solving the dispute that brings the
client to the lawyer in the first place.6 3
One should also note that she came of age professionally at a
time of great debate in Arizona about the meaning of legal practice
and the traditions of the profession. In the 1961 case of State Bar of
Anzona v. Arnzona Land Title and Trust Co.,64 the State Bar of
Arizona sought a declaratory judgment that certain realtors and title
insurance companies were engaging in the unauthorized practice of
law in the course of handling of real-estate transactions.65 These
60. Id at 276 ("A nation's success or failure in achieving democracy is judged in part by
how well it responds to those at the bottom and the margins of the social order. Those of us in
positions of influence and power can never be complacent and comfortable with the status quo.
However sturdy our foundation, however strong our legal and political institutions, we must
acknowledge that our societies are not perfect.").
61. O'Connor, Legal Education, supra note 11, at 660 ("To be sure, the first obligation
of a law school is to teach students the substantive law and how to analyze and incorporate
sufficient practical training to equip the graduate with the essential skills required for the
practice of law. But law schools must do even more than that. They need to instill a
consciousness of the moral and social responsibilities to the lawyer's clients, to the courts in
which the lawyer appears, to the attorneys and clients on the other side of an issue, and to
others who are affected by the lawyer's conduct.").
62. O'CONNOR, MAJESTY, supra note 9, at 226. In commenting on the increase in
incivility she notes:
It has been said that a nation's laws are an expression of its people's
highest ideals. Regrettably, the conduct of lawyers in the United States
has sometimes been an expression of the lowest. Increasingly, lawyers
complain of a growing incivility in the profession, and of a professional
environment in which hostility, selfishness, and a win-at-all costs
mentality are prevalent.
Id.
63. Id. at 226-28.
64. State Bar of Ariz. v. Ariz. Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d I (Ariz. 1961).
65. Id. at 4. The case focused on a broad category of actors in the real-estate field
including all Arizona corporations engaged in the land-title insurance business, and in many
instances also acting in other fiduciary or representative capacities, such as executor,
administrator, trustee, broker, receiver, underwriter, depository and agent, general or escrow.
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entities and individuals who were in the business of conveying real-
estate drafted a variety of documents and implicitly gave their
customers advice that in reality was not unlike advice that lawyers
would generally give in similar situations.66  Moreover, in what we
might now call multidisciplinary practice, the actions of these entities
and individuals were aided by what were in essence in-house
lawyers.67
In finding against the real-estate brokers and title companies, the
case was built around an examination of the nature of the legal
profession.6 8 After giving a sweeping historical account of the legal
profession and citing the work of the former Harvard Law School
Dean Roscoe Pound, the court declared that the practice of law was
one of the traditional learned professions dedicated to service and not
to earning money.69 The Arizona Supreme Court distinguished
lawyers from other providers who were not part of traditional
professions through their absence of motivation by business ideals,
declaring:
From this historical trend it is inevitable to
conclude that as the body of the law has grown, the
Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. In describing the substance of the work done with the aid of lawyers, the court
found:
The essence of the complaint against the title companies is that they,
acting by and through attorneys and other persons employed by them, in
connection with the conduct of their businesses and transactions have
been and are regularly and continuously preparing, drafting and
formulating documents affecting title to real property for their numerous
clients, patrons, and customers, and giving legal advice regarding such
transactions and instruments so drafted, constituting the unauthorized
practice of law.
Id.
68. Id at 5-8.
69. Id at 6 (citing POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMEs 6, 10
(1953)) The court found Roscoe Pound's thoughts on the ideal of a profession instructive:
Historically there are three ideas involved in a profession:
organization, learning, i.e., pursuit of a learned art, and a spirit ofpublic
service. These are essential. A further idea, that of gaining a livelihood, is
involved in all callings. It is the main if not only purpose of in the purely




community has needed and continues to require the
services of men learned in the law. It follows that
when legal tasks are performed by men who are
neither professionally trained nor motivated, the best
interest of the public cannot be served.7 0
Moreover, lawyers are bound by high professional ideals
embodied in the Canons of Professional Ethics, which are not
enforceable against those who are merely running a business for
profit.7 1 It is the specially trained lawyer who can assist a layperson
with the complexities of real-property transactions.7 2 The public can
have faith in the abilities of a licensed lawyer because he or she has
been "approved by the courts, and subject to their discipline when he
fails to live up to the ethics of the profession."7 3
The title companies and those who work within them are
unqualified to handle legal matters, and "they are not normally
governed by the code of ethics to which lawyers are subject; their
principal motivation is the business of the title company, not of the
customer."74 Furthermore, the fact that title companies and brokers
have historically been engaged in this activity is immaterial to the
court's duty to regulate the practice of law and to protect the public
from potential harms.7 ' The court then issued a declaratory judgment
outlining what aspects of real-estate conveyancing constitute the
70. Id at 8. One must note the gendered construction of the comment. The practice of
law was so much a "man's world," which in part explains Justice O'Connor's difficult entry
into it.
71. Id at 9 (citing CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (AM. BAR Ass'N
1908). The court emphasized that while the lawyer is subject to a code of ethics, the entities
involved here are not so focused on the ideal of putting the customer and client first. The court
wrote that:
Many of the Canons of Professional Ethics which attorneys must observe
most scrupuously [sic] are diametrically opposed to the code by which
businessmen must live if they are to survive. Perhaps the most important
applicable Canon states that: "The lawyer owes 'entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,' to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally
applied."
Id
72. Id at 8.
73. Id
74. Id. at 10.
75. Id at 13.
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practice of law and thus can only be done by lawyers and what
practices do not constitute the practice of law and can be done by title
companies and real-estate brokers.7 6
This case was grounded in the theory that lawyers are traditional
professionals who are committed to the ideal of service and the values
of the profession's ethical codes.7 7 Additionally, lawyers have
specialized training that prepares them to offer legal counsel to the
public. 7 8 While it is true that lawyers also make a living by offering
their legal services, the history of the profession has demonstrated
that it is responsible for "the administration of justice through a spirit
of public service."7 9 This was also essentially the finding of the
Arizona Supreme Court in the Bates case: "The interest of the States
in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to
the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have
historically been 'officers of the courts.'"80
Such important issues are not easily settled, especially when the
competing parties have interests that are vital to their way of doing
business. The realtors and title-insurance companies successfully
mounted a ballot initiative to amend the Arizona constitution so that
they would be able to continue their historical practice of preparing
all aspects of real-estate transactions.81 Against vigorous opposition
from the Arizona Bar, the amendment was passed with strong public
support on November 6, 1962, just a year after the Arizona Supreme
Court had decided differently.
At the heart of the matter was the issue of whether attorneys
were motivated by a concern for the public's welfare or by their own
self-centered economic interests in protecting their ability to earn
fees, the ideal of public service notwithstanding. Furthermore, there
was the recognition that perhaps persons seeking to sell or buy real-
estate did not always need a lawyer. Additionally, if the concern was
how to protect the public, then the realtors had a code of ethics as
well that placed upon them the ideal of fiduciary responsibility to the
76. Id. at 14-15.
77. Id. at 8.
7 8. Id.
79. Id.
80. In re Bates, 555 P.2d 640, 643 (Ariz. 1976), afl'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).





persons they served. The business of practicing law was on the cusp
of fundamental change and the public was becoming aware that some
services and products necessary for addressing some legal needs
could be done without a lawyer.
At the time of these decisions, Justice O'Connor was a sitting
Arizona judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals. Justice O'Connor
would later also note the business aspect of the practice of law, but
distinguished lawyers from other professionals because of their
commitment to public service. Her sentiments certainly reflect
those expressed by the Arizona Supreme Court in the real-estate
conveyancing case. The people of Arizona had a different opinion
about who could provide such services. For Arizona, the United
States Supreme Court effectively settled the debate on the commercial
aspect of professionalism with respect to lawyer advertising in
Bates.84 This tension is reflected in her jurisprudence on these issues,
as we shall see below. First, we will attempt to acquire a deeper
understanding of her point of view on these issues.
Justice O'Connor's canons of professionalism are animated by
the ideal of public service. Ironically, Justice O'Connor herself
returned to the thinking expressed by the Arizona Supreme Court in
the realtors' case in describing the nature of professionalism by also
citing to Roscoe Pound's definition of professionalism grounded in
the ideal of public service. By experience alone, her legal and
83. O'Connor, Professionalism, supra note 11, at 200 ("Certainly, life as a lawyer is a bit
more complex today than it was a century ago. The ever-increasing pressure of the
marketplace-the need to bill hours, to market to clients, and to attend to the bottom line-
have made fulfilling the responsibilities of community service quite difficult. But public
service marks the difference between a business and a profession.").
84. In the final analysis, however, it is the title companies and real-estate brokers who
won the debate. They were able to successfully amend the Arizona Constitution to allow them
to engage in the same practices that brought about the Bar complaint in the first place. See
Marks, supra note 8 1; Hon. Charles C. Bernstein, The Arizona Realtors and the 1962 Arizona
Constitutional Amendment, 29 UNAUTHORIZED PRAc. NEWS 129, 169 (1963); Robert E.
Riggs, Unauthoized Practice and the Public Interest: Arizona's Recent Constitutional
Amendment, 37 S. CAL. L. REv. I (1964).
85. O'Connor, Professionalism: Remarks, supra note 11, at 198. Observing the
dissatisfaction lawyers have with their professional lives and the public dislike of the legal
profession, Justice O'Connor states:
I believe that a decline in professionalism is partly responsible for this
state of affairs. Dean Roscoe Pound said that a profession is "a
group . .. pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of
public service-no less a public service because it may incidentally be a
means of livelihood." On graduation from law school, aspiring attorneys
2015] 115
WILLAMETTELA WREVIEW
political career was dedicated to serving the public as a private
lawyer, public lawyer, legislator, and judge. She recognized that
attorneys are imbued with great power by virtue of their training and
status within the legal system. This is the point she made strongly in
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association when she called for innovative
methods for inculcating professional values.87  This is also the
message she regularly made when speaking at law schools before an
audience of law students, lawyers, and legal educators.88
Her ideal of public service embodies two perspectives. First, she
believes that as officers of the court, lawyers stand in a unique
position to uphold the rule of law and to offer the means by which
ordinary citizens can gain access to the courts to protect their rights.
This larger role for lawyers extends beyond the practical need to
make a living, which is certainly a necessity, but it also suggests that
lawyers are commissioned to work for the good of society. Second,
the ideal of public service includes providing pro bono services to
those who cannot afford to hire a lawyer. In many ways, her own
private practice reflected this ideal because she took clients who
walked in off of the street and she took criminal cases that were
assigned from the court.89 All lawyers should do their part to make
services available to the poor.90 She even suggests hat this duty has
global reach.91 At the end of the day, lawyers will receive a great
deal of professional and personal satisfaction in engaging in pro bono
work.92
In sum, Justice O'Connor's canons of professionalism begin
with her own personal commitment to excellence. She has had a
remarkable career as a talented, skillful lawyer, dedicated to
performing her best on behalf of the people she serves. As such, the
do not simply gain the means of a comfortable livelihood. They also
assumed the obligations of professionalism; obligations in their dealings
with other attorneys; obligations toward legal institutions; and obligations
to the public.
Id.
86. Id. at 229.
87. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 490 (1988).
88. See O'Conner, Legal Education, supra note 11, at 660; O'Connor, Professional
Competence, supra note 11, at 7; O'Connor, Professionalism supra note 11, at 385; O'Connor,
Professionalism: Remarks, supra note 11, at 200.
89. O'Connor, Courthouse Dedication, supra note 11, at 2.
90. O'Connor, Meeting, supra note 11, at 6.
91. O'Connor, Ceeli supra note 11, at 717.
92. Id. at 720.
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framework for her professional canon is structured by the ideal of
lawyers serving the public. This is a moral objective because, as
officers of the court, lawyers have been granted enormous power in
the systems that actualize our laws. Moreover, lawyers must always
understand that the law through which they practice is majestic for the
following reasons: First, the existence of a functioning society
depends on our moral commitment to the rule of law.93 Second, the
fundamental principles of freedom, democracy, and justice are at the
core of our law.94 Finally, these principles must be understood in the
context of a constitutional democracy that is situated in a
governmental framework of federal and state regulatory
jurisdictions.95 The federal and state governments each have a proper
role and sphere of influence.96 However, it is the People who have
the final say through representative government.97  And it is the
People who have civil rights that cannot be readily usurped by
government.
98
To insure the protection of constitutionally recognized liberty
interests, citizens must be able to defend their rights in courts of law.
If we are to remain free, it is morally imperative that justice be made
available to all citizens. Lawyers are the ones who hold the keys to
justice. One pauses to note that, while holding up the Bill of Rights as
the foundation of these liberty interests, Justice O'Connor privileges
the First Amendment because it grants the awesome ability to speak
out against and for the government without fear of repercussion.99
This bedrock belief shapes her thinking on commercial free speech by
lawyers.
II. PROFESSIONALISM AND LEGAL ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION IN
THE WINDS OF CHANGE
To understand the analytical perspective of Justice O'Connor on
legal advertising is to see the tension between tradition and change in
law and society. 1o The constitutional protection of legal advertising
93. O'CONNOR, MAJESTY, supra note 9, at 73.
94. Id. at 64.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 245.
98. Id. at 35.
99. Id at 61, 255.
100. Id at 269-70.
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emerged at a critical intersection of change in the way lawyers
practiced, in the expansion of the constitutional critique of the First
Amendment, and in the monumental changes in society. The civil
rights movements of the sixties and early seventies were fueled in part
by lawyers advocating for social justice through the courts.'o' At the
same time, law schools expanded the pool of potential students to
include more minorities, women, and individuals from nontraditional
backgrounds.10 2  Traditional, large law firms grew in size as new
fields of practice were developed and mass-tort litigation became a
lucrative area of practice. Concurrently, the organized bar sought to
fulfill the obligation to make legal services more generally available
and wrestled with whether pro bono legal services should be made
mandatory.'03  Moreover, lawyers were instrumental in bringing
impact litigation calculated to effect broad social changes.'04
During this period, the Supreme Court considered many
landmark cases involving the reach of the First Amendment.
Professor Owen M. Fiss, in his book The Irony of Free Speech05
noted the cases of New York Times v. Sullivan, Brandenberg v. Ohio,
and New York Times v. United States, as examples of the Court
creating modem First Amendment jurisprudence.10 6 At the heart of
these and other First Amendment cases, is the tension between the
government's regulatory role in promoting legitimate state interests,
such as preserving order and the fundamental value of expression,
101. Id. at 132-38 (paying tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, the primary legal
architect of the civil rights movement); see also GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK:
CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983) (describing
how Charles Hamilton Houston prepared a cadre of civil rights lawyers who developed a
strategy to secure equal rights under the Constitution for all Americans); James E. Moliterno,
The Lawyeras Catalyst ofSocial Change, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559 (2009).
102. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850S TO THE 1980s 234 (1983).
103. See generally A.B.A. Special Committee on Public Interest Practice, Implementing
the Lawyer's Public Interest Obligation, 63 A.B.A. J. 585, 678 (1977).
104. E.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), alrd in part rev'd in
part, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), a/Pd in part rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (establishing important rights for people with mental
illnesses, especially those confined to state mental-health institutions); see also Michael L.
Perlin, 'Abandoned Love"- The Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney on the Intersection Between
International Human Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
121, 121 (2011) (noting the significance of Stickney).
105. OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996). See generally N.Y. Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
106. FISS, supra note 105, at 6.
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especially political expression designed to promote civil rights or
challenge governmental policies.10 7 The protests against the Vietnam
War, for example, brought First Amendment cases to the Supreme
Court and pushed the traditional analysis of constitutional protections
to areas never contemplated by constitutional scholars.0 8 Professor
Fiss suggests that the doctrinal advancement of First Amendment
jurisprudence recognized not only the constitutional limits on states
regulating speech, but also a role for states to allow for the expression
of ideas with which many in society would disagree, such as hate
speech and pornography.10 9
The 1960s were a period of profound social, political, and
cultural change. The civil rights movement propelled the country out
of the Jim Crow era11o and towards a society where access to full
participation in all fundamental rights would not be predetermined by
race."' Other groups of citizens also organized to achieve full social,
political, and economic equality.112 From a political perspective, a
plethora of legislation was enacted to guarantee basic rights such as
voting, employment, and housing. Many of these laws were the result
of citizens standing up, speaking out, and calling on their government
to act for the good of all in society. 113 Culturally, the society opened
up to new musical genres (rhythm-and-blues, rock-and-roll, and soul)
more sexual freedom to experiment with nontraditional relationships,
and the mobility to go anywhere in the country and the world.114
107. Id. at 6-7.
108. Eg, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding
that students have some First Amendment rights even while attending a public school and
could thereby express their opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to
school). See generally Sullivan, 376 U.S at 254 (dealing with whether a state must award
damages to a public official for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct).
109. Fiss, supra note 105, at 18-19.
110. See HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL IS RESTED: THE STORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN THE DEEP SOUTH (1977).
111. See E. CULPEPPER CLARK, THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR: SEGREGATION'S LAST
STAND AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA (1993) (chronicling the admission of Vivian
Malone and James Hood into the university in spite of Governor George Wallace standing in
the door defying a federal order to allow the admission).
112. See FISS, supra note 105, at 9-10 (noting the development of civil rights laws
fostered a wider conception of rights).
113. Eg, FRED GRAY, BUS RIDE TO JUSTICE: CHANGING THE SYSTEM BY THE
SYSTEM-THE LIFE AND WORKS OF FRED GRAY (1995) (describing the career of the lawyer
who represented Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Rosa Parks, and provided legal counsel to the
Montgomery Bus Boycott, the desegregation of Alabama schools, and the 1965 Selma to
Montgomery march for voting rights).
114. See JAMES C. HALL, MERCY, MERCY ME: AFRICAN-AMERICAN CULTURE AND
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More can be said about this period of rapid social change, but suffice
it to say that the following discussion shows the developing First
Amendment doctrines that would mirror the changes in traditional
orthodoxy, both legally and socially, when Justice O'Connor
expounded upon her canons of professionalism.
A. Connecting the First Amendment to Professionalism in NAACP v.
Button
While it may be said that Bates v. State Bar of Anzona opened
up the legal advertising floodgates, it is NAACP v. Button" that
foreshadowed the constitutional conundrum of how to accommodate
the ideals of professionalism with the ever-increasing need for the
legal profession to make legal services broadly available and
financially sustainable. This case arose out of the many legal battles
that followed the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,116 which declared that segregation by race in public
schools was unconstitutional. 117 After Brown was decided, many
states engaged in what was called massive resistance to integration of
public schools.1 8  To counter this resistance, the NAACP, 119 the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. (Defense Fund),120 and the
Virginia State Conference of NAACP Branches121 pursued a vigorous
litigation campaign to effectuate the mandate in Brown.122  In
Virginia, the NAACP's Virginia State Conference hired staff lawyers
to bring such suits and would call in Defense Fund's lawyers for
assistance.123 The NAACP members and staff lawyers held
informational meetings describing the right to an equal education and
would encourage individuals to sign up to bring cases against local
THE AMERICAN SIXTIES (2001).
115. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
116. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
117. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976) (discussing the history of Brown v.
Board).
118. See OLIVER HILL, THE BIG BANG-BROwN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BEYOND: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF OLIVER W. HILL, SR. 168 (Jonathan K. Stubbs ed., 2000);
see also Walter Murphy, The Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W. POL. Q. 371
(1959) (discussing the efforts of southern states to defeat the ruling of Brown).
119. See Button, 371 U.S. at 419.
120. Id. at n.5.
121. Id. at 419.
122. See HILL, supra note 118, at 178-82.
123. Button, 371 U.S. at 420-21.
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school boards that had refused to integrate the schools.124
The NAACP, led by attorneys Oliver Hill,1 2 5  Spottswood
Robinson,12 6 Robert Carter,12 7 and Thurgood Marshall, 2 8 sought
injunctions declaring that these statutes violated the First Amendment
and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 129 Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, found that the activities of the
petitioners were of the kind demanding the full protection of the First
Amendment.'3 0  Moreover, the lawyers were engaging in an
important form of political expression designed to "achiev[e] the
lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal,
state and local, for the members of the Negro community in this
country."'3 ' Further, the lawyers not only were properly representing
the desires of individual clients but also were expressing the
objectives of the organizations involved.13 2 Accordingly, a provision
of the law that could sanction these lawyers for pursuing the
constitutional rights of their clients implicated the right of free
expression.13 3  Justice Brennan vigorously defended these First
124. Id. at 421-22.
125. Oliver Hill became a leading attorney in Virginia and the Virginia State Bar named
the annual Pro Bono Award after Mr. Hill. See Hill, supra note 118.
126. Spottswood Robinson became a federal district court judge. BiographicalDirectory
of Federal Judges.- Robinson, Spottswood William III, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.
gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=203 1&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
127. Robert Carter became a federal district court judge. Biographical Directory of
Federal Judges: Carter, Robert Lee, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetinfo
?jid=392&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
128. Thurgood Marshall became United States Solicitor General and then a United
States Supreme Court Justice. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Marshall, Thurgoo,
FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=1489&cid=999&ctype=na&instate
=na (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
129. See Button, 371 U.S. at 444.
130. Id at 429-30 (noting the importance of being able to bring such an action against
the government). The Court stated:
We meet at the outset the contention that "solicitation" is wholly outside
the area of freedoms protected by the First Amendment. To this
contention there are two answers. The first is that a State cannot
foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels. The second
is that abstract discussion is not the only species of communication which
the Constitution protects; the First Amendment also protects vigorous
advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against government intrusion.
Id. at 429.
131. Id.
132. Id at 430.
133. Id at 432-33 (discussing the Court's concern about whether the statute was too
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Amendment freedoms by declaring, "These freedoms are delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society. The threat
of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions." 34
Contrastingly, Justice Harlan, in a dissent joined by Justices
Clark and Stewart, found that the Court was impermissibly interfering
with the "the domain of state regulatory power over the legal
profession."l3 5  While recognizing the importance of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments' rights,l Justice Harlan focused on the
actual conduct of the NAACP lawyers and the state's strong interest
in maintaining regulatory supervision of the profession.137 Noting that
there must be a balance struck between these competing interests, he
observed that the constitutional rights at stake were not absolute.3 8
He articulated the following test: "So here, the question is whether the
particular regulation of conduct concerning litigation has a reasonable
relation to the furtherance of a proper state interest, and whether that
interest outweighs any foreseeable harm to the furtherance of
protected freedoms." 3 9 For Justice Harlan, the regulations were
reasonably related to the State's concern about the profession,14 0
which he found were not intended to discriminate against the NAACP
or to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights.141
NAACP v. Button provides the example of how lawyers were
expanding the ways in which they represented clients. First, in this
instance, they were finding clients to represent by which the
constitutional law of the land could be actualized. This was only
novel in that the reach of these efforts to fight school segregation
were vast. As the Court noted, "The sheer mass of such (and related)
litigation is an indication of the intensity of the struggle." 42 The
vague or overbroad so that a lawyer could not determine whether he or she was in danger of
ethical sanction).
134. Id. at 433.
135. Id. at 448 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
136. Id at 452-53.
137. Id at 451-53.
138. Id at 453-54.
139. Id at 455.
140. Id
141. Id at 455, 469-70.
142. Id. at 435 n.16 (majority opinion) (listing twenty-seven named cases with multiple
opinions issues in ten different Virginia municipalities where segregation was being
challenged.); see also id. at 436 ("We cannot close our eyes to the fact the militant Negro civil
rights movement has engendered the intense resentment and opposition of the politically
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instant case follows in a longer tradition of impact litigation pursuing
fundamental civil rights, such as Plessy v. Ferguson,4 3  arte
144 Stt S hiv. 145 un .UitdSatS 146Texas, United Shiop, Gunn United States,146 and
Buchanan v. Warley.147  Second, the First Amendment rights of
lawyers were recognized and vigorously protected by the Supreme
Court. The tension between advocacy and the First Amendment is
brought into focus by the need for and the method of obtaining clients
seeking to vindicate political rights. Finally, this case wrestles with
how to shape the professional framework by which states can regulate
the practice of law. Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court sets
the stage for Justice O'Connor's later development of her
professionalism jurisprudence.
B. Commercial Free Speech Meets Professionalism in Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona
The Bates v. State Bar ofArizona case was an extension of the
development of commercial free-speech jurisprudence as presented in
Virginia Pharmacy v. Vrginia Consumer Council.I48 Virginia
Pharmacy permitted pharmacists to advertise the prices of their
products, especially those products that had become standardized and
were fungible with similar drug products sold by other pharmacists.149
As First Amendment theories have developed for political speech,
commercial speech is protectable on the ground that the speaker has
the right to impart information to the public and society has a right to
receive such information so that informed decisions can be made
dominant white community of Virginia; litigation assisted by the NAACP has been bitterly
fought.").
143. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also John Minor Wisdom, Plessy v.
Ferguson-100 Years Later, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 9 (1996).
144. Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900) (challenging exclusions of blacks on grand
juries); see also Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904).
145. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906) (challenging a habeas corpus petition
against a local official who refused to protect a black prisoner from lynching); see also MARK
CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY
LYNCHING THAT LAUNCHED A HUNDRED YEARS OF FEDERALISM (1999).
146. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (challenging the exclusion of black
voters by way of the grandfather clause in voting legislation in Maryland and Oklahoma).
147. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (challenging Louisiana's discriminatory
real-property ordinance).
148. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
149. See id. at 773-74 (Burger, J., concurring).
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about the purchase and use of pharmaceutical services.150 In addition
to the marketplace of political ideas, the First Amendment also
protects the marketplace of commercial ideas and information.151 The
legitimate concern over professionalism was outweighed by the First
Amendment rights of the individuals to receive commercial
information about the availability of the lowest prices for the goods
and service they seek in the marketplace.1 5 2
Professionalism was also at the heart of the Bates case.'53
Fundamentally, the tradition in the profession was that it was
undignified for lawyers to advertise.15 4  Before the adoption of the
American Bar Association's Disciplinary Rules, the American Bar
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics governed the manner in
which lawyers could present themselves to the public. 155 The new
Disciplinary Rules reflected the sentiment in the old Canons of
Professional Ethics with an updated list of dos and don'ts.15 6
Attorneys Bates and O'Steen recognized that times were changing,
and their experience, especially with legal services,15 7 convinced
them that low- and moderate-income individuals had limited access to
legal services due to costs and lack of information about how to
obtain the services of a lawyer. The attorneys concluded that if they
set up their practice in a way that provided specific, routine services
at set prices, they could make legal services available to a wider range
of the public and still be able to earn a respectable living.15  To
achieve this, the attorneys needed to generate a sufficient volume of
business and be efficient in serving clients in order to have a
150. Id. at 770.
151. Id. at 764 ("Generalizing, society also may have a strong interest in the free flow of
commercial information. Even an individual advertisement, though entirely 'commercial,'
may be of general public interest."); see also id. at 761.
152. Id at 770.
153. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 365-68 (1977) (noting that professional-
ism was a main concern of the state). The Court observed that "[t]he key to professional-
ism . . . is the sense of pride that involvement in the discipline generates. It is claimed that
price advertising will bring about commercialization, which will undermine the attorney's
sense of dignity and self-worth." Id at 368.
154. Id
155. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 27 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1908) (setting
out a specific list of dos and don'ts).
156. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 355 n.5.
157. Id at 354.
158. Id (opening their practice in March 1974 with intentions to provide legal services
at modest fees to "persons of moderate income who did not qualify for government legal aid").
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sustainable practice.'59  They reasoned that volume could best be
achieved by advertising their practice, which they called a "Legal
Clinic."l 60 The lawyers also ran newspaper advertisements li ting the
prices for certain legal services.161 Consequently, the State Bar of
Arizona sanctioned the lawyers for violating Disciplinary Rule 2-
101(B), which stated:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his
partner, or associates or any other lawyer affiliated
with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper
or magazine advertisements, radio or television
announcements, display advertisements in the city or
telephone directories or other means of commercial
publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do
so in his behalf.16 2
After a hearing, a local grievance committee originally gave the
two lawyers a six-month suspension.'6 3 On review, the Arizona State
Bar's Board of Governors recommended a one-week suspension.16 4
The two lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court of Arizona on the
grounds that the disciplinary rule violated the federal antitrust
provisions under the Sherman Act and was an impermissible
restriction of their right to free speech under the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution.16 5 The Supreme Court of Arizona
found that the Sherman Act did not apply to the states as held by the
United States Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown.16 6 The Arizona
Supreme Court also relied heavily on Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar
in its antitrust analysis.'67 The Arizona Supreme Court found that the
minimum price setting by a local bar association, which the United
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 354 n.4 (noting the advertisements accompanied by subsequent news stories
increased business).
162. Id. at 355.
163. In re Bates, 555 P.2d 640, 648 (Ariz. 1976) (Hays, J., dissenting), a/Id in part,
rev'dinpartsubnom. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
164. Id. at 641 (majority opinion).
165. Id. at 642-43.
166. Id. at 643 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943)).
167. Id. (citing Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)).
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States Supreme Court found to be anticompetitive in the Goldfarb
case, was distinguishable from the minimum-fee schedule set by
attorneys Bates and O'Steen.'6 8 The State had complete authority to
regulate the profession, including whether lawyers could advertise.16 9
On the First Amendment claim, the Supreme Court of Arizona in
In re Bates acknowledged such speech had some protection under the
First Amendment, but believed that legal advertising could still be
restricted as a method of regulating the profession.'70 The court noted
a larger societal concern, stating, "[t]he legal profession, like the
medical profession, has always prohibited advertising since it is a
form of solicitation deemed contrary to the best interest of society."'7 '
On appeal of the antitrust and First Amendment issues, the
United States Supreme Court first upheld the state court's finding on
the claim that the Sherman Act did not apply to the states in this
instance.172  The Court focused on the regulatory role of the state
supreme court over the legal profession and found no need to consider
whether there was an impermissible, anticompetitive impact on the
lawyers who wished to advertise.17 3 However, it should be noted that
the Court, in its discussion of the First Amendment, considered the
issue of competition in the legal field as related to the impact of fee
comparisons, the rising cost of practice due to advertising, and
whether advertising caused barriers to entry for young lawyers who
had difficulty competing with firms with advertising budgets. 174 The
168. Id at 643 (focusing on the regulatory role the state court has over attorneys who are
officers of the court).
169. See id at 643 (finding that Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) was not inconsistent with
the holding of Goldfarb and noting that the special regulatory function the State has over the
profession).
170. See id. at 644.
171. Id.
172. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz, 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977).
173. Id. at 361-62 (quoting Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). The
Court considered the differences between Goldfarb and Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.
579 (1976), on the question of state action for antitrust purposes, and found that the state bar
was acting as a state actor:
In contrast, the regulation of the activities of the bar is at the core of the
State's power to protect the public. Indeed, this Court in Goldfarb
acknowledged that "[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is
especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental
function of administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of
the courts."'
Id
174. Id at 377-78. When considering whether increased costs for advertising would
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Court found that advertising might even lower the costs of legal
services because potential clients could search for the lowest price. 175
Hence the economic aspects of the practice of law are always present
in advertising cases even if they are not in the foreground.
In addressing the First Amendment issue, the Court applied the
commercial-speech doctrine established in Vnrgiia Pharmacy,
extending it to the state's regulation of the legal profession.'76 Justice
Blackmun reviewed the justifications presented by the State and
found none of them sufficiently persuasive to overcome the free-
speech claim of the attorneys.17 7 None of the advertisements were
misleading, false, or deceptive; made comparisons about the quality
of services offered by other practitioners; or were illegal.1' The
opinion noted that in-person solicitation may give cause for
regulatory concern and that there may by "reasonable restrictions on
the time, place, and manner of advertising."'79 The Court succinctly
stated its narrow holding as follows:
The constitutional issue in this case is only
whether the State may prevent the publication in a
newspaper of the appellants' truthful advertisement
concerning the availability and terms of routine legal
services. We rule simply that the free flow of such
information may not be restrained, and we therefore
hold that the present application of the disciplinary
rule against appellants to be violative of the First
Amendment. 1
The notion of encouraging the free flow of information and ideas
was most salient during this period. Expressions of all forms could
only be restricted by the state for compelling reasons. With a
have any impact on the amount lawyers charge in fees, the Court recognized, as a factual
matter, that the State's concern about creating entry barriers cut both ways.
175. Id. at 377.
176. Id at 365. while reviewing the opinion of Virginia Pharmacy, the Court pointed
out its consideration of comnercial speech as a negative influence on the professionalism for
pharmacists, and noted that that opinion reserved for another day how the analysis would
apply to other professions. The Court used this occasion to apply those First Amendment
principles to lawyers.
177. Id. at 379.
178. Id at 383-84.




populace animated by social protest and the opening up of social and
economic opportunities for all, any governmental restrictions on free
speech were suspect. The problem was finding valid limits for free
expression by legal professionals. Nonetheless, after Bates was
decided, the organized bar was slow to respond to the new
jurisprudential regime and the jurisprudence on professionalism
would evolve in a piecemeal fashion.'8'
III. BATESPROVIDES ANSWERS AND MANY MORE QUESTIONS
The case reflects the challenges in applying the commercial free-
speech doctrine. This is the challenge with which Justice O'Connor
wrestles in balancing her ideas about professionalism and the First
Amendment's commercial-speech doctrine. The indeterminate nature
of First Amendment doctrine, varying perceptions of case facts, and
divergent philosophical priorities, especially those linked to
professionalism, all conspire to offer and effect divergent paths for
resolving these claims. To begin with, the application of seemingly
fluid First Amendment principles can lead to conflicting results. The
opinion recognizes that some questions over the extent of commercial
free-speech cannot be simply answered without considering the
context of the speech.18 2  For example, the Court would seem to
permit the tight regulation of in-person speech or direct solicitation of
clients.18 3 However, there is no guidance on how a state might
effectively issue ethical rules that pass First Amendment
constitutional muster.18 4  How does one achieve a balance between
181. See Gerald S. Reamey, Life in the Early Days of Lawyer Advertising: Personal
Reflections ofa Bates Baby, 37 ST. MARY'S L.J. 887 (2006). The author describes becoming a
lawyer in Texas the year that Bates was decided and notes that no lawyers in his area were
advertising. He reports that the Texas Bar's response to the decision was one of reluctant
acceptance.
182. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. The Court found that legal advertising cannot be suppressed
but that it is still subject to regulation and several aspects of it will be subject to further
scrutiny. The Court concluded:
As with other varieties of speech, it follows as well that there may be
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising.
Advertising concerning transactions that are themselves illegal obviously
may be suppressed. And the special problems of advertising on the
electronic broadcast media will warrant special consideration.
Id. (citations omitted).
18 3. Id
184. Id. at 404-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court had virtually
obliterated the distinctions between protected speech and unprotected speech). Justice
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the state's efforts to promote professionalism and the economic
practicalities of law practice? As we shall see below, this is the main
problem with which the Court grappled in the advertising and
solicitation cases that it reviewed over the next three decades.'8 5
Additionally, different Justices apply different reasoning to each
case depending on how expansive they believe the Bates case permits
the reading of free-speech doctrine.1 86  Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in part and dissenting in part in Bates, was apprehensive
about the Court's extension of the Virginia Pharmacy case to the legal
advertising of so-called routine services.'87  Chief Justice Burger's
main disagreement with the case was that the ban on legal advertising
was designed to protect the public "from the unscrupulous or the
incompetent practitioner anxious to prey on the uninformed." 1 88
Justice Powell's separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part and joined by Justice Stewart, focused on "the vastly increased
potential for deception and the enhanced difficulty of effective
regulation in the public interest."1 89 Justice Powell concluded that,
"[u]ntil today, in the long history of the legal profession, it was not
thought that this risk of public deception was required by the marginal
Rehnquist concluded:
I think my Brother Powell persuasively demonstrates in his opinion
that the Court's opinion offers very little guidance as to the extent or
nature of permissible state regulation of professions such as law and
medicine.... Once the exception of commercial speech from the
protection of the First Amendment which was established in Valentine v.
Christensen was abandoned, the shift to case-by-case adjudication of First
Amendment claims of advertisers was a predictable consequence.
Id. (citation omitted).
185. Id at 402-03 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (anticipating the
challenge of regulating in this area given the changing nature of the legal profession). Justice
Powell explained that "[tihe problem has not been resolved with complete satisfaction despite
diligent and thoughtful efforts by the organized bar and others over a period of many years,
and there is no reason to believe that today's best answers will be responsive to future needs."
Id.
186. See id
187. Id at 386 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (expressing his
reservations about extending the Virginia Pharmacy case). Chief Justice Burger wrote that
"[s]ome Members of the Court apparently believe that the present case is controlled by our
holding one year ago in [ Virginia Pharmacy]. However, I had thought that we made most
explicit that our holding there rested on the fact that the advertisement of standardized,
prepackaged, name-brand drugs was at issue." Id. (citation omitted).




First Amendment interests asserted by the Court."'9 0  Justice
Rehnquist, in another separate opinion, dissenting in part and joining
in part, also expressed reservations about extending First Amendment
doctrine as far as the Court insisted:
I continue to believe that the First Amendment
speech provision, long regarded by this Court as a
sanctuary for expressions of public importance or
intellectual interest, is demeaned by invocation to
protect advertisements of goods and service. I would
hold quite simply that the appellants' advertisement,
however truthful or reasonable it may be, is not the
sort of expression that the Amendment was adopted to
protect.191
For the Court to move towards the constitutional protection of
the First Amendment, it will by necessity have to cut the state-created
regulatory system loose from the traditional professional moorings
dating back to beginnings of the American bar.192 Professionalism
had to drift in an ever-rising tide of a fast-paced economic revolution
where marketing became the dominant feature of promoting a legal
practice.193
Also, the Justices tended to disagree about the meaning of the
facts presented to support or oppose a claim of First Amendment
interference and thus the factual support for the asserted state's
interests in regulating speech. For example, in Bates, how is one to
determine a routine service that would always be provided at the same
listed fee, especially when that fee is said to be reasonable?1 9 4 As to
190. Id. at 404.
191. Id.
192. See JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 197-200 (rev.
ed. 1924) (1916); see also, Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius Henry Cohen and the
Origins of the Business/Profession Dichotomy. A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth
Century Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (2005).
193. O'CONNOR, MAJESTY, supra note 9, at 230 (recognizing an essential part of law
practice is marketing). O'Connor wrote: "Certainly, life as a lawyer is a bit more complex
today than it was a century ago. The ever-increasing pressure of the legal marketplace-the
need to bill hours, to market to clients, and to attend to the bottom line-have made fulfilling
the responsibility of community service difficult."
194. Bates, 433 U.S. at 392 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting, as a factual matter, there is hardly a clear method for determining routine legal
services especially when one considers the unique nature of each case). Justice Powell wrote:
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reasonableness of a fee, even if one applies the Bates rules on
reasonable fees, can we be assured of finding that value?19 5  Justice
Powell warned, "Whether a fee is 'very reasonable' is a matter of
opinion, and not a matter of verifiable fact as the Court suggests."'96
Consequently, when reading the advertisement, how does one
determine whether it is misleading or deceptive?9 7 Nothing in the
advertisement suggests that even with a so-called simple divorce, a
host of sub-issues, such as custody, support, property, and other
matters unique to each individual client could arise.198 Moreover, as
Justice Powell points out, the idea of a routine, uncontested divorce
ignores the larger ole of the attorney in handling these matters:
More important from the viewpoint of the client
is the diagnostic and advisory function: the pursuit of
relevant inquiries of which the client would otherwise
be unaware, and advice with respect to alternative
arrangements that might prevent irreparable
dissolution of the marriage or otherwise resolve the
client's problem. 199
The Justices appear to have differing views on this issue. The
Bates majority emphasized the need of the listener to obtain more
information about the availability and price of some basic legal
services.2 00  The majority concluded that the State is being
paternalistic, and found that information, even if incomplete, is better
"Even the briefest reflection on the tasks for which lawyers are trained and the variation
among the services they perform should caution against facile assumptions that legal services
can be classified into the routine and the unique." Id.
195. Id. at 395.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 394. Justice Powell's reading of the advertisement leads to a different
conclusion about its clarity:
The average lay person simply has no feeling for which services are
included in the packaged divorce, and thus no capacity to judge the nature
of the advertised product. As a result, the type of advertisement before us
inescapably will mislead many who respond to it in the end, it will
promote distrust of lawyers and disrespect for our own system of justice.
Id.
198. Id at 392-93.
199. Id at 393.
200. Id at 364 (majority opinion).
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than a client ignorant about his or her rights.2 0 1 The dissenting
opinions focused on the State's interest in protecting the public from
being deceived or mislead by confusing advertisements.2 0 2
Furthermore, the pecuniary interest of attorneys in offering legal
services in this fashion may lead some attorneys to short shrift the
client because the lawyer would not be able to fully advise and
diagnose the extent of the problem presented.2 0 3 In any event, the
varying opinions address the issues from differing factual assessments
of the nature of legal practice and ideas about professionalism.
To further stretch the analytical exercise of determining the facts,
how does one read the various reports that are submitted by the
contending sides?2 0 4 Some are given more weight than others, which
shades the analytical conclusions each Justice makes. For example, on
the question of whether legal advertising would present enforcement
and disciplinary problems, Justice Blackmun does not see this as any
different from any other disciplinary matter.20 5 However, Justices
Powell and Burger each reference an American Bar Association
(ABA) study suggesting that enforcement of unethical advertising
would be burdensome.206 Justice Blackmun's majority opinion did
201. Id. at 374-75 ("Moreover, the argument assumes that the public is not sophisticated
enough to realize the limitations of advertising, and that the public is better kept in ignorance
than trusted with correct but incomplete information. We suspect the argument rests on an
underestimation of the public.").
202. Id. at 392-95 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing
routine services and what could be called reasonable fees); see also id at 394 n.7 (expressing
concern about defining a legal clinic). Justice Powell wrote:
Use of the term "clinic" to describe a law firm of any size is unusual, and
possibly ambiguous in view of its generally understood meaning in the
medical profession. Appellants defend its use as justified by their plan to
provide standardized legal services at low prices through the employment
of automatic equipment and paralegals.
Id. Contra id. at 381-82 (majority opinion) (the majority found that the idea of a clinic was
something that the public would have little difficulty understanding).
203. Id. at 393 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. Id. at 370 n.22 (majority opinion).
205. Id. at 379.
206. Id at 396 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Citing the ABA
study, Justice Powell stated: "In view of the sheer size of the profession, the existence of a
multiplicity of jurisdictions, and the problems inherent in the maintenance of ethical standards
even of a profession with established traditions, the problem of disciplinary enforcement in
this country has proved to be extremely difficult." Id. Chief Justice Burger raised similar
concerns about the same ABA study and stated: "To impose new regulatory burdens called for
by the Court's decision on the presently deficient machinery of the bar and courts is
unrealistic; it is almost predictable that it will create problems of unmanageable proportions."
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not mention the ABA study.207 At the heart of what Attorneys Bates
and O'Steen were attempting to do was to make legal services
available to those who could not afford them. Justice Blackmun cited
studies that suggested people do not seek counsel because they
believe it is unaffordable or they do not know how to.2 0 8  Justice
Powell saw advertising as diluting professionalism at a time when the
ABA and the Federal Legal Services Corporation were striving to
make legal services available to those who could not afford them.209
While not naming specific studies, he noted that in making legal
service available, "Study and experimentation continue.,21
Accordingly, one's position on an issue is buttressed by which report
or study is used to back up that position.
And finally, the constitutional doctrines and the factual
presentments are tinged by the philosophical priorities that are
brought to the analysis.2 11 Clearly, the varying opinions disagree on
how much deference to give to the state in its regulatory decision-
making process. Since we do not regulate attorneys on a federal basis,
the question becomes: how much latitude can be afforded to the states
while still protecting free-speech principles?212 Some Justices would
give greater deference to the states in regulating an attorney
disciplinary system.
Philosophical priorities are also evident in how the Justices
consider the idea of professionalism. This includes the nature of
professionalism and whether it precludes an acknowledgement that
lawyers not only serve the public but also earn a living and pay the
cost of operating an office.2 13  Traditionally, the bar has viewed
Id. at 387. See generally AM. BAR ASS'N SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY
ENF'T PROBLEMS, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
(1970), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/cpr/reports/ClarkReport.authc
heckdam.pdf.
207. Id. at 379 (majority opinion).
208. Id. at 370-71.
209. Id at 397-98 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. Id. at 399.
211. See Katherine R. Kruse, Fidelity to Law and the Moral Pluralism Premise, 90 TEX.
L. REV. 657, 664-65 (2012) (taking issue with W. Bradley Wendel's premise in his book,
LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO THE LAW (2010)). The article takes issue with the premise that a
lawyer's conduct can be directed by identifying "the normative judgments woven into the
fabric of legal standards and procedures." Id. at 664. Kruse determines that certain
controversies have no clear answer because society has not fully agreed on what our norms
should be in interpreting the law. Id at 665.
212. SeegenerallyNAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
213. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368 (majority opinion).
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advertising as undignified for an honored profession and has been
philosophically opposed to being viewed as participants in "[t]he
hustle of the marketplace."2 14 In fact, the Court looks at the historical
nature of the tradition and notes that, "It appears that the ban on
advertising originated as a rule of etiquette and not as a rule of
ethics."21 5 Hence there is no philosophical reason for considering the
advertising ban as preserving an ethical tradition.2 16 Moreover, if the
question were to focus on the issue of the need to inform the public
that legal services are available, there is a disagreement on who
should bear that task. The dissent asserts that the bar should take on
the job of informing the public about how the legal system works and
where legal help can be found.21 7 The majority would prefer a
perspective that lawyers are fully capable of truthfully advertising
about the availability of legal services. 218 In the final analysis, it is the
majority opinion that recognizes that lawyers can be trusted to fulfill
their ethical obligations and maintain the historical level of
professionalism:
We suspect that, with advertising, most lawyers
will behave as they always have: They will abide by
their solemn oaths to uphold the integrity and honor of
their profession and of the legal system. For every
attorney who overreaches through advertising, there
will be thousands of others who will be candid and
honest and straightforward. And, of course, it will be
in the latter's interests, as in other cases of misconduct
at the bar, to assist in weeding out those few who
abuse their trust.219
Ideas about the First Amendment, fact interpretation and
application, and philosophical differences on professionalism and the
state's role in regulating attorneys frame the challenges when
discussing legal advertising and solicitation. As implied above, these
214. Id.
215. Id. at 371.
216. Id. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Justices Powell and Rehnquist disagree on
whether any form of legal advertising could be constitutionally protected). Justice Rehnquist
stated he was "unwilling to take even one step down the 'slippery slope."').
217. Id. at 388 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
218. Id. at 376-77 (majority opinion).
219. 1d. at 379.
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three themes resonate in the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, and are evident in Justice
O'Connor's opinions as discussed below. As Justice Powell
suggested, this case left many questions unresolved and reset in
motion the continuing debate about he business side of practicing
law.22 0 Once the advertising door was opened, the limits would be
determined by how the votes were cast in the Supreme Court.
IV. ADDITIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ASSESSING LEGAL ADVERTISING
AND SOLICITATION BEFORE JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S TENURE
When Justice O'Connor came to the Court she wrestled with the
issue of professionalism in the context of legal advertising and
professionalism in the context of evolving commercial free-speech
doctrine. The cases discussed in this section frame the debate on
attorney speech in print and in-person solicitation by setting the
conceptual issues implicit in the First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech in light of government efforts to regulate nonpolitical speech.
Virginia Pharmacy, Bates, and other cases establish the principle of
commercial free speech, but leave to the cases discussed in this
section the task of articulating a workable analytical basis for
assessing the proper balance between free speech and government
regulation. All of this doctrinal evolution in commercial free speech
will fill out the analytical background that Justice O'Connor would
draw upon in her thinking about professionalism and free speech.
A. The First Amendment Measuring Stick ofCentral Hudson
The Court would eventually try to nail down a standard for the
application of commercial free-speech doctrine in the Central Hudson
Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
220. Id. at 402-03 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Discussing the
heart of the problem of regulating the business side of practice and the challenges facing a self-
regulating profession, Justice Powell stated:
The problem of bringing clients and lawyers together on a mutually fair
basis, consistent with the public interest, is as old as the profession itself.
It is one of considerable complexity, especially in view of the constantly
evolving nature of the need for legal services. The problem has not been
resolved with complete satisfaction despite diligent and thoughtful efforts
by the organized bar and others over a period of many years, and there is




York.221 In brief, this case involved the issue of whether a utility
could send promotional and informational materials to its customers
encouraging them to use more electricity at a time when the Public
Service Commission was trying to get the public to conserve
electricity. The nation was experiencing an energy crisis due to an
embargo of oil by Arab oil-producing countries.22 The Court, in an
opinion by Justice Powell, held that the Commission could not restrict
the utility's efforts to promote electricity consumption through
advertising that was truthful and not unlawful.223 Further, in order for
the state to so restrict the commercial speech of the utility, the state
had to meet the following three-part analysis: there must be a finding
of a substantial state interest, the interest is advanced by the
restriction, and it is narrowly drawn.224
While Justice Powell calls this a four-part test,225 it is generally
viewed as a threshold inquiry or set of questions about deception and
legality of the speech (which has no constitutional protection),
followed by a three-part analysis weighing the state's interest against
the right of the speaker to say and the listener to hear information
useful for informed economic decision making.226 This approach was
certainly evident in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Florida
Bar v. WentForlt, Inc., a case that is discussed below. 227
221. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
222. Id at 583 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
223. Id at 563-64 (majority opinion). Justice Powell expressed the threshold inquiry as
follows:
The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the
informational function of advertising. Consequently, there can be no
constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that
do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The
government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the
public than inform it, or commercial speech related to illegal activity.
Id (citations omitted).
224. Id. at 564.
225. Id. at 565.
226. Id at 566.
227. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995). Justice O'Connor
synthesized the Central Hudson test (as it had evolved) as follows:
Under Central Hudson, the government may freely regulate commercial
speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Commercial
speech that falls into neither of those categories, like the advertising at
issue here, may be regulated of the government satisfies a test consisting
of three related prongs: First, the government must assert a substantial
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Justice Rehnquist, in an extensive dissenting opinion in Central
Hudson, found that the Court's opinion offered too much First
Amendment protection and did not give adequate deference to the
state as it attempted to articulate a substantial government interest.228
He had previously expressed this philosophical tension in Bates.2 29 In
Central Hudson he wrote an extensive dissenting opinion criticizing
the Court's rush to continue to elevate commercial speech to the level
of political speech.230 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the type of
restriction at issue was well within the power of the state, and that the
judiciary had no role in substituting its own opinion.2 31 He also found
the Court's definition of commercial speech confusing and of little
guidance to states attempting to draft regulations designed to protect
the public for harms potentially caused by the speech.232
Nevertheless, Central Hudson continues to be the measuring stick for
analyzing commercial-speech cases in spite of the discordant opinions
of the Justices.23 3
B. The Solicitation Standard ofOhralik and Primus
Before Justice O'Connor was appointed, the Court heard the case
of Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association in 1978.234 In that case, the
Court considered whether an attorney could solicit legal business by
going directly to a potential client to persuade that person to retain the
attorney's services.23 5 Here, the attorney, Albert Ohralik, sought to
represent two women who were injured in an automobile accident.23 6
interest in support of its regulation; second, the government must
demonstrate that the restriction on commercial speech directly and
materially advances that interest; and third, the regulation must be
"narrowly drawn."
Id. (citations omitted).
228. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 584-85.
229. Justice Rehnquist would find it difficult to apply the Central Hudson test in an
expansive manner considering his view in Bates v. State Bar ofArizona, 433 U.S. 350, 404
(1977).
230. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 598.
231. Id at 589.
232. Id. at 594-95.
233. See generally STEVEN G. BRODY & BRUCE E.H. JOHNSON, ADVERTISING AND
COMMERCIAL SPEECH: A FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE ch. 3, at 26-30 (Practising Law Inst., 2d
ed. 2004).
234. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
235. Id at 449.
236. Id. (noting that Ohralik learned of the case by chance). The Court stated, "On
February 13, 1974, while picking up his mail at the Montville Post Office, appellant learned
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He first sought the women out in the hospital where they were
recovering from their injuries and later visited their homes to obtain
their signatures on a retainer agreement.2 37 To make matters worse,
Ohralik secretly recorded his discussions with the women to prove
that they retained him.2 38 When the women decided not to use
Ohralik's legal services he attempted to use the recording to
demonstrate that the women had entered into a binding contract with
him. 2 39 The women filed ethics complaints against Ohralik, alleging
improper solicitation in violation of the code of professional
responsibility, and he was eventually sanctioned by the Ohio State
Bar.240 In his appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, Ohralik claimed
that he had a First Amendment right to speak to potential clients.24 1
That court held that this speech was not constitutionally protected,
and so he appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court held that, while this form of
speech was of a commercial nature, the State had a substantial interest
in proscribing this form of conduct, an issue left open in the Bates
case.243  Justice Powell, writing for the Court, stated, "In such a
situation, which is inherently conducive to overreaching and other
forms of misconduct, the State has a strong interest in adopting and
from the postmaster's brother about an automobile accident that had taken place on February 2
in which Carol McClintock, a young woman with whom appellant was causally acquainted,
had been injured." Id.
237. Id. at 467 (noting the intrusiveness and pressure that Ohralik placed on the two
women). The Court stated, "He approached two young accident victims at a time when they
were especially incapable of making informed judgments or of assessing and protecting their
own interests." Id.
238. Id at 450-51.
239. Id. at 467.
240. Id. at 452-54; see also Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 357 N.E.2d 1097 (Ohio
1976), ai/F' 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
241. Ohralik, 357 N.E.2d at 1098.
242. Id
243. Ohraik, 436 U.S. at 462 (noting the substantial interests the State has in protecting
the public from unscrupulous lawyers). The Court stated:
We need not discuss or evaluate each of these interests in detail as
appellant has conceded that the State has a legitimate interest and indeed
"compelling" interest in preventing those aspects of solicitation that
involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other
forms of "vexatious conduct." We agree that protection of the public





enforcing rules of conduct designed to protect the public from
harmful solicitation by lawyers whom it has licensed."244 In this case,
the attorney attempted to push these women into an attorney-client
relationship at a vulnerable time while they were recovering from
their injuries.2 45 In addition, he did not have a prior relationship with
them, and the women and the attorney were not close family.246 As a
result, the disciplinary rule served an important state interest in
protecting the public from such intrusive and overbearing attempts to
* 247pursue a pecuniary objective.
When the Court decided the Ohrahk case, it also decided In re
Primus, a case involving a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties
Union who was pursuing a class-action suit involving women on
welfare claiming to be involuntarily sterilized by the State.2 48 Edna
Smith Primus, the attorney in that case, sent a solicitation letter with a
follow-up to women who may have been sterilized.24 9 Relying on its
earlier case of NAACP v. Button, the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Powell, reasoned that this particular form of speech involved the
vindication of possible civil rights claims and was thus
distinguishable from commercial speech.25 0  Further, the State's
concern about commercialization's negative impact on the legal
profession is not justified where a nonprofit organization offers its
services for free in a case where political rights are at issue.251
In a dissent, Justice Rehnquist saw this as a contest between
good and bad.252 An attorney is good if the attorney, like Edna
Primus, acts with First Amendment protection to solicit potential
244. Id at 464.
245. Id. at 453 (citing the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility provisions DR 2-
103(A) and DR 2-104(A), which prohibit in-person solicitation to persons who are not in a
close relationship with the attorney).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 468.
248. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 414-18 (1978).
249. Id at 417. The letter dated August 30, 1973, in part, said: "You will probably
remember me from talking with you at Mr. Allen's office in July about the sterilization
performed on you. The American Civil Liberties Union would like to file a lawsuit on your
behalf for money against the doctor who performed the operation." Id. at 416 n.6.
250. Id. at 431 ("Appellant's letter of August 30, 1973, to Mrs. Williams thus comes
within the generous zone of First Amendment protection reserved for associational freedoms.
The ACLU engages in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and association,
as well as a means of communicating useful information to the public.").
251. Id.at436-37.
252. Id. at 440 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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clients to pursue the vindication of political rights.2 5 3 An attorney is
bad and subject to discipline if the attorney, like Albert Ohralik, acts
with little First Amendment speech protection by directly soliciting
clients for purely pecuniary purposes.254 Justice Rehnquist did not
see how the Court justified the distinction between the two situations
where lawyers are actively soliciting clients.2 55 Justice Rehnquist
emphasized the proper role of the State in enforcing ethical standards
deemed necessary to protect the public from the dangers of lawyers
overbearing the will of vulnerable potential clients.256 In essence, this
was a factual matter for the state to determine.2 57  Rehnquist's
position is shaped, in part, by his philosophical perspective that the
Court is not in the position to make this decision for states even when
political rights are at stake.258
These two cases represent an affirmation of Bates and the basic
structure of free-speech analysis applied to attorney advertising and
solicitation. Attorneys may speak to the public to convey information
about their availability to provide legal services. In this regard, there
is a continuum of protectable speech. At one end is speech that is
directed toward protecting the constitutional rights of citizens. There,
free speech is most protected from state infringement. At the other
end is speech that is permissible commercial speech. There, the
attorney must not overreach in a manner that diminishes the listener's
will to avoid the speech if the potential client is in a vulnerable
situation, as in 012ralik. Moreover, the cases suggest that states have
an important interest in protecting the public, and hence, states have
an important role to play in regulating the commercial speech conduct
of attorneys. Courts have yet to decide the states' roles in ensuring a
high level of professionalism within the practice of law. This is the
challenge that Justice O'Connor later addressed when she became a
member of the Supreme Court.
V. THE O'CONNOR ERA AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR PROFESSIONALISM
Justice O'Connor was sworn in as an Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court on September 25, 1981. At that time,
253. Id
254. Id.
255. Id. at 443-44.
256. Id. at 445.
257. Id. at 446.
258. Id. at 445-46.
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she was a judge on the Arizona Appellate Court from 1979; prior to
that she was a judge on the Maricopa County Superior Court
beginning in 1974. Due to her familiarity with Arizona law, Justice
O'Connor was aware of the efforts by attorneys Bates and O'Steen to
break new ground in the way they practiced law, especially since the
Supreme Court of Arizona issued its opinion in that case in 1976.259
In Justice O'Connor's first year on the bench, the Court took up the
first lawyer-advertising case to consider the application of Bates, thus
intensifying the Court's efforts to grapple with the tensions between
professionalism and the First Amendment.
A. O'Connor Dissents From the March A way From Traditional
Professionalism
In November of Justice O'Connor's first term, the Court heard
the case of In re R.Mj 2 6 0  That case involved the application of
Disciplinary Rule 2-101 that limited the amount, the content, and the
form of information a lawyer could use in an advertisement.2 61 For
example, the most restrictive aspect of Disciplinary Rule 2-101 placed
limits on the way a lawyer was allowed to describe the areas of
practice in which the lawyer engaged.2 62 The rule also limited how a
lawyer may represent a specialty in a specific area of law. 2 63  The
attorney in In re R.MJ listed the following as areas of practice:
"'personal injury' and 'real-estate' instead of 'tort law' and 'property
law'-and that included several areas of law without analogue in the
list of areas prepared by the Advisory Committee-e.g., 'contract,'
'zoning & land use,' 'communication,' [and] 'pension & profit
sharing plans."' 2 64  Moreover, the attorney did not include a
disclaimer that any of the "areas of practice [do] not indicate any
259. In re Bates, 555 P.2d 640, 640 (Ariz. 1976), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
260. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
261. Id. at 193-94 (noting that the Supreme Court of Missouri instituted Disciplinary
Rule 2-101, permitting lawyer advertising, after the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Bates v. State Bar ofArizona).
262. Id. at 194-95.
263. Id. at 195 ("Alternatively, he may use one or more of a list of 23 areas of practice,
including, for example, 'Tort Law,' 'Family Law,' and 'Probate and Trust Law.' He may not
list both a general term and specific subheadings, nor may he deviate from the precise wording
stated in the Rule. He may not indicate that his practice is 'limited' to the listed areas and he
must include a particular disclaimer of certification of expertise following any listing of
specific areas of practice.").
264. Id. at 197.
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certification of expertise therein."2 65
Justice Powell, writing the opinion of the Court, applied the
reasoning of the Bates and Central Hudson decisions266 and found
that the advertisements were not misleading, the State had no
substantial interests that justified restricting free speech in this
manner, and there were no findings that the practices at issue were
difficult to enforce.26 7 In fact, Justice Powell observed that the
manner in which the lawyer identified his areas of practice was more
informative than the narrow list provided by the State.26 8
Nevertheless, Justice Powell's opinion recognized that states, when
they articulate a substantial interest, still have the authority to regulate
lawyer speech as long as "the interference with speech [is] in
proportion to the interest served."2 6 9  This is the standard for
commercial free-speech analysis that was articulated in Central
Hudson.270
The next major case involving regulating the commercial speech
of lawyers was Zauderer v. Office of Discphna?/ Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio.271  Among other issues,272 this 1985 case
involved an attorney who sought to generate clients by advertising
that he was willing to represent women injured by an intrauterine
265. Id. at 195.
266. Id at 203.
267. Id. at 206 (addressing the issue of mailing announcement cards to potential clients
and the fact that there were less restrictive methods for vindicating the state's interest). Justice
Powell wrote:
Mailings and handbills may be more difficult to supervise than
newspapers. But again we deal with a silent record. There is no
indication that an inability to supervise is the reason the State restricts the
potential audience of announcement cards. Nor is it clear that an absolute
prohibition is the only solution. For example, by requiring a filing with
the Advisory Committee of a copy of all general mailings, the State may
be able to exercise reasonable supervision over such mailings.
Id.
268. Id at 205.
269. Id at 203.
270. Id.
271. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626 (1985).
272. Id. at 631 (noting the attorney was also alleged to have violated Ohio Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(A) because he deceptively ran an advertisement to
represent criminal defendants charging what appeared to be a contingent fee based on the
outcome, which is strictly prohibited).
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birth-control device called the Dalkon Shield.2 73 The advertisement
contained a drawing of the device, described the terrible
consequences of using the device, and averred that persons who were
harmed could still bring a cause of action against the manufacturer.27 4
The disciplinary case against the attorney alleged that he had violated
several disciplinary rules, including placing an ad that was not
dignified by providing an illustration of the device, not disclosing the
fact that in a contingent-fee case the client may have to pay expenses
and costs, and giving unsolicited legal advice to unrepresented
persons with the intent of obtaining employment.275  Because the
advertisement was not misleading or deceptive, the Court held that
the advertisement was protected by the First Amendment and
potential litigants had a right to receive such information.27 6
However, the Court noted that states could require attorneys to
disclose to potential clients how contingent-fee arrangements work.277
In a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
Justice O'Connor first expressed her dissatisfaction with how the line
of case law developing out of Bates and Central Hudson have been
applied to regulating professional conduct.27 8 The heart of the matter
273. Id. at 630.
274. Id at 631 ("The advertisement was successful in attracting clients: appellant
received well over 200 inquiries regarding the advertisement, and he initiated lawsuits on
behalf of 106 of the women who contacted him as a result of the advertisement.").
275. Id. at 632-33.
276. Id at 646-47 (holding that the state's prophylactic rule on all such advertising that
truthfully identifies the rights of potential litigants was too broad and did not demonstrate a
sufficient state interest). The Court stated:
Prophylactic restraints that would be unacceptable as applied to
commercial advertising generally are therefore equally unacceptable as
applied to appellant's advertising. An attorney may not be disciplined for
soliciting legal business through printed advertising containing truthful
and nondeceptive information and advice regarding the legal rights of
potential clients.
Id.
277. Id at 650-53.
278. Id. at 676 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (noting that the case law on professional conduct was drifting toward
ordinary commercial regulation). Justice O'Connor stated:
In my view, state regulation of professional advice in advertisements is
qualitatively different from regulation of claims concerning commercial
goods and merchandise, and is entitled to greater deference that the
majority's analysis would permit. In its prior decisions, the Court was
better able to perceive both the importance of state regulation of
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for Justice O'Connor was the idea that an attorney could give
unsolicited legal advice via an advertisement, and then obtain legal
employment by recommending himself for the job.27 9 Justice
O'Connor wrote, "In my view, the use of unsolicited legal advice to
entice clients poses enough of a risk of overreaching and undue
influence to warrant Ohio's rule." 2 8 0 First, from a factual analysis,
this method of obtaining employment is not unlike the in-person
solicitation the Court condemned in the Ohlraik case. Justice
O'Connor characterized the advertisement as "bait."2 81 In this
circumstance, a potential client wondering if she has a claim will visit
the attorney's office where, because the attorney will have a personal
financial interest, "the same risk of undue influence, fraud, and
overreaching that were noted in Ohralik are present."282
Second, in applying the commercial free-speech analysis, Justice
O'Connor would utilize a much narrower focus when it came to
regulating the advertisement of professional services. Justice
O'Connor stated, "In my view, state regulation of professional advice
in advertisement is qualitatively different from regulation of claims
concerning commercial goods and merchandise, and is entitled to
greater deference than the majority's analysis would permit."283
Stating the core of her canon, Justice O'Connor said, "Lawyers are
professionals, and as such, they have a greater obligation."2 8 4
Finally, Justice O'Connor reached this conclusion regarding
unsolicited legal advice based on her philosophical belief that lawyers
owe a high duty to society to not accept employment after giving
unsolicited legal advice.2 85 Furthermore, since states have a
professional conduct, and the distinction between professional services
and standardized consumer products.
Id.
279. Id at 673-74.
280. Id. at 673.
281. Id at 678.
282. Id.
283. Id at 676.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 677. Noting the ethical understanding of a lawyer's professionalism, Justice
O'Connor stated:
The legal profession has in the past been distinguished and well served by
a code of ethics which imposes certain standards beyond those prevailing
in the marketplace and by a duty to place professional responsibility
above pecuniary gain. While some assert that we have left the era of
professionalism in the practice of law, substantial state interests underlie
144 [52:99
O'CONOR'S CANONS
substantial interest in protecting the public from undue influence and
overreaching by self-interested lawyers, Justice O'Connor would
defer to the states to make this regulatory call even if the information
conveyed in the advertisement is truthful.286 In addition, because
states have a substantial interest in lawyers acting with the highest
professional conduct, Justice O'Connor would also defer to the states
to determine the standard of this professional conduct.2 8 7
Justice O'Connor next gave a detailed analysis of the Court's
commercial free-speech doctrine as applied to legal advertising and
solicitation in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, which was
decided by the Supreme Court in 1988.288 That case involved a
lawyer who sought legal work by sending letters to potential clients
with home mortgages in foreclosure.2 8 9 The lawyer had sought prior
approval from the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission, an
organization created by the Kentucky State Bar Association to
regulate attorney advertising.2 90 The majority opinion by Justice
Brennan applied the now-standard commercial free-speech analysis
and found that this form of advertising was protected by the First
Amendment.291 As Justice Brennan stated, "Lawyer advertising is in
the category of constitutionally protected commercial speech."2 9 2
This reasoning was due to the minimal potential harm to clients,293
many of the provisions of the state codes of ethics, and justify more
stringent standards that apply to he public at large.
Id. (citation omitted).
286. Id
287. Id at 678 (contemplating the state's interest in establishing a higher standard of
professional conduct that reflects the idea of self-sacrifice). Justice O'Connor stated:
The State also has a substantial interest in requiring that lawyers
consistently exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of
their clients. Given the exigencies of the marketplace, a rule permitting
the use of legal advice in advertisements will encourage lawyers to
present that advice most likely to bring potential clients into the office,
rather than that advice which it is most in the interest of potential clients
to hear.
Id
288. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
289. Id. at 469.
290. Id. at 469 n..
291. Id at 479-80.
292. Id. at 472.




and the fact that the State had much less restrictive methods for
insuring that the lawyers' targeted mailing was not misleading.294
One alternative to a direct ban suggested by the court was for the
envelope to "[bear] a label identifying it as an advertisement."2 9 5
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, wrote a strong dissent in opposition to the ever-expanding
world of legal advertising and solicitation. Justice O'Connor gave the
following criticism of the Court's use of Zauderer as the basis for
deciding the present case: "As today's decision illustrates, the Court
has been unable or unwilling to restrain the logic of the underlying
analysis within reasonable bounds. The resulting interference with
important and valid public policies is so destructive that I believe the
analytical framework itself should now be reexamined."2 9 6
In presenting this critique, Justice O'Connor first reminded her
colleagues that she dissented in Zauderer because she prefers to defer
to the states in these matters.2 97 More significantly, the factual
comparison of advertising for professional services to advertising for
consumer products was illusory for two reasons. First, Justice
O'Connor reasoned that a typical potential client would have
difficulty evaluating the quality of legal services offered by the brief
"free sample" offered in the advertisement.2 9 8  Second, the legal
advice offered in that advertisement is tainted by the lawyer's purpose
of obtaining legal business when "an attorney has an obligation to
provide clients with complete and disinterested advice."29 9
Justice O'Connor then offered a fuller critique of the Court's
doctrine on commercial speech.3 00 She firmly believed that under the
Like print advertising, petitioner's letter-and targeted, direct-mail
solicitation generally-"poses much less risk of overreaching or undue
influence" than does in-person solicitation. Neither mode of written
communication involves "the coercive force of the personal presence of a
trained advocate" or the "pressure on the potential client for an immediate
yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation."
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985)).
294. Id. at 476-77.
295. Id. at 477. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY r. 7.3(c) (AM. BAR
ASS'N 2013).
296. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 480 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 481.
298. Id
299. Id
300. Id at 484 (noting the commercial free-speech doctrine has been expanded too
broadly). Justice O'Connor stated, "The latest developments, in Zauderer and now today,
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First Amendment the commercial-speech doctrine should not have the
same level of protection from government interference as
noncommercial speech.30 1  The balancing analysis presented in
Central Hudson provides a process for courts to review whether a
governmental regulation impermissibly impacted commercial
speech.3 02 For Justice O'Connor, the Court has not used sufficient
"discernment," especially when evaluating the nature of the
government interest.303 She noted:
Decisions subsequent to Virginia Pharmacy and
Bates, moreover, support the use of restraint in
applying this doctrine to attorney advertising. We
have never held, for example, that commercial speech
has the same constitutional status as speech on matters
of public policy, and the Court has consistently
purported to review laws regulating commercial
speech under a significantly more deferential standard
of review. 304
Applying Zauderer to the instant case, Justice O'Connor would
have reached a different result than the majority by focusing on
potentially harmful effects of targeted, direct-mail advertising. First,
receiving a personally addressed letter from an attorney may lead the
recipient to conclude that it comes with the "authority of the law
itself." 3 0 5 The formal nature of the letter likely encourages people to
respond to the inquiry. Second, the "letters are designed to suggest
that the sender has some significant personal knowledge about, and
concern for, the recipient."3 0 6  This attempt to create a personal
rapport may lend itself to improper influence and overreaching on the
lawyer's part by creating a false sense of trust in the lawyer.0 Third,
confirm that the Court should apply its commercial speech doctrine with more discernment
than it has shown .... Decisions subsequent to Virginia Pharmacy and Bates, moreover,
support the use of restraint in applying this doctrine to attorney advertising." Id.
301. Id at 483-84.
302. Id at 485.
303. Id. at 484.
304. Id
305. Id at 481-82.
306. Id. at 482.
307. Id at 481-82 ("For people whose formal contacts with the legal system are
infrequent, the authority of the law itself may tend to cling to attorneys just as it does to police
officers. Unsophisticated citizens, understandably intimidated by the courts and their officers,
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because the public holds lawyers in high esteem, the recipient may
not realize that the lawyer is writing a letter that "contain[s] advice
that is unduly tailored to serve the pecuniary interests of the
lawyer."308 Instead of focusing purely on the needs of the potential
client, the material may be slanted towards the attorney's desire to
obtain work. 30 9 These three points are enough for Justice O'Connor
to determine that states have a substantial interest in preventing such
harm to the public by unscrupulous lawyers under the reasoning of
Zauderer.310
For Justice O'Connor, based on the facts presented by the
government, more weight should be given to the government's
substantial interest "in promoting the high ethical standards that are
necessary in the legal profession."3 11 This is particularly true when
considering the great need to protect the public from unscrupulous
lawyers who use slick advertising techniques.312 In Shapero, Justice
O'Connor believed targeted, direct mailings and fee quotations for so-
called routine legal service were potentially misleading.313 Moreover,
because lawyers have a personal, economic interest in the results of
the advertising, Justice O'Connor was concerned about "the corrosive
effects that such advertising can have on appropriate professional
standards."314 The economic self-interest of the advertising lawyer
distorts the lawyer's judgment in a way that lifts the lawyer's interest
in financial reward above that of the client's interest in having a
counsel committed to being unselfishly loyal to that client.315 Justice
O'Connor was not persuaded by contrary claims that the restrictions
on legal advertising inhibit economic efficiency by denying lawyers
the ability to transmit price information for consumers to make an
informed decision.3 16
may therefore find it much more difficult to ignore and apparently 'personalized' letter form
an attorney than to ignore a general advertisement.").
308. Id. at 482.
309. Id.
310. Id at 482-83 (noting direct-mail advertising and in-person solicitation call for
regulation despite their differences).
311. Id at 485.
312. See id. at 486.
313. Id at 485-86.
314. Id at 486.
315. Id. at 489-90.
316. Id at 488 (noting economic analysis can work against the desire for maintaining
core professional values). Justice O'Connor stated:
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In concluding her dissent, Justice O'Connor turns more deeply to
the essence of her stance on professionalism. From a philosophical
point of view, Justice O'Connor again strongly asserted her
disagreement with Bates, which held that commercial speech in the
form of legal advertising is protected by the First Amendment
because lepal services are not in the same class as consumer
products. Conflating legal services with consumer goods and
services was a Court-dictated policy decision that Justice O'Connor
believed "was not derived from the First Amendment, and it should
not have been used to displace a different and no less reasonable
policy decision of the State whose regulation was at issue."3 18 Hence,
Justice O'Connor would defer to states in their proper role of
regulating the conduct of lawyers and would apply the principles of
Central Hudson to uphold states' interest in doing so.3 19
States have a special responsibility to articulate professional
values because as Justice O'Connor posits:
Both the special privileges incident to
membership in the profession and the advantages
those privileges give in the necessary task of earning a
living are means to a goal that transcends the
accumulation of wealth. That goal is public service,
which in the legal profession can take a variety of
familiar forms. This view of the legal profession need
not be rooted in romanticism or self-serving
sanctimony, though of course it can be. Rather,
special ethical standards for lawyers are properly
understood as an appropriate means of restraining
lawyers in the exercise of the unique power that they
Assuming, arguendo, that the removal of advertising restrictions should
lead in the short run to increased efficiency in the provision of legal
services, I would not agree that we can safely assume the same effect in
the long run. The economic argument against hese restrictions ignores
the delicate role they play in preserving the norms of the legal profession.
While it may be difficult to defend this role with precise economic logic,
I believe there is a powerful argument in favor of restricting lawyer
advertising and that this argument is at the very least not easily refuted by
economic analysis.
Id.





inevitably wield in a political system like ours.32 0
For Justice O'Connor, the idea that the legal profession has
special privileges is derived from several realities. First, to become a
member of the profession, lawyers must be equipped with extensive
training and knowledge about how the legal system functions.32 1
Second, because of their education, lawyers have a unique legal skill
set that places them in a position of power with the ability to achieve
legal objectives that clients cannot adequately obtain on their own. 3 2 2
Third, with that power comes a recognition that lawyers are
committed to the ideal of "public service," broadly defined.3  Justice
O'Connor draws this proposition from the work of Roscoe Pound,
observing, "This training is one element of what we mean when we
refer to the law as a 'learned profession."'3 24 This ideal also tracks
back to the earlier discussion on State Bar ofAnzona v. Arizona Land
Title and Trust Co.
Justice O'Connor believes that lawyers are public servants
committed to upholding the system of justice even when that requires
the sacrifice of one's own interests.32 5 Accordingly, to achieve the
traditional ideal of public service, regulation of the legal profession is
important because "membership entails an ethical obligation to
temper one's selfish pursuit of economic success by adhering to
standards of conduct that could not be enforced by ethical legal fiat or
through the discipline of the market."3 26 Due to the legal profession's
immense power, an attorney should place the client's interest above
the personal interest of the attorney, but some attorneys will not
always do so. As a result, regulations, such as those that restrict
advertising and solicitation, are needed to guard against economic
self-interest edging out the ideals of the profession.3 2 7  That task,
developing appropriate models for obtaining those ideals, can
certainly be left, in part, to the states.3 28 Moreover, it requires a
320. Id. at 489.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 490.
323. Id at 489.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 489.
326. Id at 488-89.
327. Id. at 490.
328. Id. at 490-91 (recognizing restrictions on advertising and solicitation are but part of
the process of establishing appropriate ethical conduct, but nonetheless a necessary part to
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comprehensive effort to promote professional ideals from law schools
and bar associations by developing an air of expectation for aspiring
to the highest ideals.329
As more cases involving lawyers' rights to free speech came
before the Court, Justice O'Connor continued to be in the minority,
waiting for the Court to see the error of its ways in the Bates case.33 0
In Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of
Illinois, the Court considered whether an attorney could hold himself
out as a certified, civil-trial specialist having attained that designation
from the National Board of Trial Advocacy.33 1 Decided in 1990, the
case focused on whether the State could prohibit a lawyer from listing
on his letterhead that he was certified as a specialist by an
organization not sponsored or recognized by the State.3 32  The Court
combat the forces of economic expediency). Justice O'Connor stated:
Such restrictions act as a concrete, day-to-day reminder to the practicing
attorney of why it is improper for any member of this profession to regard
it as a trade or occupation like any other. There is no guarantee, of course,
that the restrictions will always have the desired effect, and they are
surely not a sufficient means to their proper goal. Given their inevitable
anticompetitive effects, moreover, they should not be thoughtlessly
retained or insulated from skeptical criticism. Appropriate modifications
have been made in the light of reason and experience, and other changes
may be suggested in the future.
Id.
329. Id. at 490 (noting a broad approach is necessary to keep economic expediency from
overtaking the professional ideal of public service). Justice O'Connor stated, "Tradition and
experience have suggested a number of formal and informal mechanisms, none of which may
serve to reduce competition (in the narrow economic sense) among members of the
profession."
330. Id at 487.
331. Peel v. Att'y Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91 (1990)
(plurality opinion).
332. Id. at 97 (noting under the disciplinary rules, an attorney could list the areas of
practice as permitted by In re RMJ., 455 U.S. 191 (1982), but could not hold himself out as a
specialist in an area of law). The Court stated:
In 1987, the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission of Illinois . . . filed a complaint alleging that
petitioner, by use of this letterhead, was publicly holding himself out as a
certified legal specialist in violation of Rule 2-105(a)(3) of the Illinois
Code of Professional Responsibility. That Rule provides: "A lawyer or
law firm may specify or designate any area or field of law in which he or
its partners concentrates or limits his or its practice. Except as set forth in





stated that the letterhead was not misleading and the public would not
believe that the certification was state sponsored. In a plurality
opinion by Justice Stevens,334  the Court held that since the
certification designation was neither actually nor inherently
misleading, the disciplinary rule violated the attorney's First
Amendment rights.335  Justice Stevens also dismissed the argument
that it was potentially misleading because the State had not
established a sufficient substantial interest justifying a prophylactic
rule.3 3 6
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.3 17  Justice O'Connor asserted
that the commercial free-speech doctrine was applied by courts far too
broadly.3 Reading the facts of the case, Justice O'Connor believed
that while the designation as a certified civil-trial specialist was
truthful, the designation was nonetheless misleading, and the State
was well within its authority to protect the public from being
misinformed by listing that designation. 3 3 9  This is especially so
333. Id. at 103-04.
334. Id. at 93, 111. (Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Kennedy joined the opinion, and
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment).
335. Id. at 110-11.
336. Id. at 108.
337. Id. at 119.
338. Id. at 126 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that inserting disclaimers about
what the certification means would cure the misleading nature of placing this information on
the letterhead). Justice O'Connor stated:
Although having information about certification may be helpful for
consumers, the Constitution does not require States to go to these
extremes to protect their citizens from deception. In my view, the Court
would do well to permit the States broad latitude to experiment in this
area so as to allow such forms of disclosure as best serve each State's
legitimate goal of assisting its citizens in obtaining the most reliable
information about legal services.
Id.
339. Id. at 121 (noting that nineteen other states had bans on listing specialty
certifications) Justice O'Connor asserted:
Charged with the duty of monitoring the legal profession within the State,
the Supreme Court of Illinois is in a far better position that is this Court to
determine which statements are misleading or likely to mislead.
Although we are the final arbiters on the issue whether a statement is
misleading as a matter of constitutional law, we should be more




because the "certification is tantamount to a claim of quality and
superiority."340 Accordingly, Justice O'Connor would defer to states
in making a decision about regulating the profession in this matter.341
Finally, as stated at the beginning of Justice O'Connor's opinion, the
ultimate problem with this case was the impact on developing
standards of professionalism, which is reflected in the following
passage:
Nothing in our prior cases in this area mandates
that we strike down the state regulation at issue here,
which is designed to ensure a reliable and ethical
profession. Failure to accord States considerable
latitude in this area embroils this Court in the
micromanagement of the State's inherent authority to
police the ethical standards of the profession within its
borders. 342
B. O'Connor takes on Commercial Free Speech as Crystallized in
Edenfield v. Fane
Justice O'Connor also found herself in the minority in Edenfield
v. Fane.343 This commercial free-speech case involved the regulation
of accountants who sought business through in-person solicitation of
potential clients.344 This was a different branch of the same First
Amendment tree that sprouted from Virginia Pharmacy and Bates.345
At first glance, Edenfield resembled the dangers of in-person
solicitation prohibited in Ohralik346 The Court held that the Florida
340. Id at 123.
341. Id at 121.
342. Id at 119.
343. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
344. Id at 763-64.
345. Id. at 770.
346. Id. at 768 (applying the Central Hudson test the Court held that the Florida Board
of Accountancy asserted interest in imposing a ban on C.P.A.'s in-person, direct solicitation)
The Court summarized the stated substantial interest as follows:
To justify its ban on personal solicitation by CPA's the [Florida Board
of Accountancy] proffers two interests. First, the Board asserts an
interest in protecting consumers form fraud and overreaching by CPA's.
Second, the Board claims that its ban is necessary to maintain both the
fact and appearance of CPA independence in auditing a business and
attesting to its financial statements.
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ban on accountant in-person solicitation was not in the same category
as the overreaching and undue influence problems that animated the
challenge in Ohralik.347 Moreover, under Central Hudson, the Court
noted the following:
[The State] has not demonstrated that, as applied
in the business context, the ban on CPA solicitation
advances its asserted interests in any direct and
material way. It presents no studies that suggest
personal solicitation of prospective business clients by
CPA's creates the dangers of fraud, overreaching, or
compromise that the Board claims to fear. 348
For the Court, the business context was different because there
was no urgent need for the accountant's services, and the business
person would generally have the experience to make an informed
choice in deciding which accountant to retain.3 4 9 Under the Central
Hudson three-part test the Court stated, "[T]hough we conclude that
the Board's asserted interests are substantial, the Board has failed to
demonstrate that its solicitation ban advances those interests."35 0
In Edenfield, Justice O'Connor solidified her jurisprudential
perspective on professionalism in the commercial free-speech context.
She began her solo dissenting opinion by again declaring that Bates
and its progeny were wrongly decided.3 5' Justice O'Connor believed
these prior cases were grounded on a narrow consideration of the
Id.
347. Id. at 774.
348. Id. at 771.
349. Id. at 775-76 (noting the experience of the prospective client and the circumstances
in which the solicitation is made makes a distinctive difference in considering whether a
restriction of speech is constitutionally permitted). In distinguishing Ohralk v. Ohio State Bar
Association, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, stated:
While the clients in Ohralik were approached at a moment of high stress
and vulnerability, the clients Fane wishes to solicit meet him in their own
offices at a time of their choosing. If they are unreceptive to his initial
telephone solicitation, they need only terminate the call. Invasion of
privacy is not a significant concern.
Id.
350. Id. at 767.
351. Id. at 778 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I continue to believe that this Court took a
wrong turn with Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, and that it has compounded this error by
finding increasingly unprofessional forms of attorney advertising to be protected speech.").
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harmful and deceptive nature of professional advertising.3 52 Justice
O'Connor would rather situate the First Amendment analysis in a
larger vision of professionalism, stating, "In my view, the States have
the broader authority to prohibit commercial speech that, albeit not
directly harmful to the listener, is inconsistent with the speaker's
membership in a learned profession and therefore damaging to the
profession and society at large."3 53 To determine whether
professional advertising is harmful and deceptive, Justice O'Connor
preferred an analysis that first considers the State's interest in
preserving and upholding the fundamental ideals of the profession, be
it legal or accounting. In the legal context, this means that the
lawyer's self-interest in retaining clients must not diminish the
lawyer's commitment to serving the public.354
For Justice O'Connor, the commercial-speech analysis of Central
Hudson must proceed from the context of professionalism, deferring
to the State's ability to decide how to best protect society from harm
done by professionals and promote professional values. Therefore,
O'Connor's application of the three-part Central Hudson analysis
does not preference the protection of speech in the commercial
context.3 5 5  In the first part of this Central Hudson analysis Justice
O'Connor parted from the majority's view that in-person solicitation
by accountants is significantly different than in-person solicitation by
lawyers as prohibited by Ohrahk3 5 6  It was not unreasonable that
Florida "could have envisioned circumstances analogous to those in
Ohrahk, where there is a substantial risk that the CPA will use his
professional expertise to mislead or coerce a naive potential client."357
3 5 2. Id.
3 5 3. Id.
354. Id. ("In particular, the States may prohibit certain forms of competition usual in the
business world on the grounds that pure profit seeking degrades the public-spirited culture of
the profession and that a particular profit-seeking practice is inadequately justified in terms of
consumer welfare or other social benefits. Commercialization has an indirect, yet profound
effect on professional culture, as lawyers know all too well.").
355. Id.; see also Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 483 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
356. Edenfilc4 507 U.S. at 779 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("But even if I agreed that the
States may target only professional speech that directly harms the listener, I still would dissent
in this case. [Ohralik] held that an attorney could be sanctioned for the in-person solicitation
of two particularly vulnerable potential clients, because of the inherent risk under such
circumstances that the attorney's speech would be directly harmful, and because a simple
prohibition on fraud or overreaching would be difficult to enforce in the context of in-person
solicitation. The result reached by the majority today cannot be squared with Ohralik.").
357. Id. at 780.
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In the second prong of the Central Husdon analysis regarding the
question of whether the regulation advances a state interest, Justice
O'Connor believed that the Court did not do an adequate factual
analysis of the reason for the rule.358 The majority opinion based its
findings on the mere suggestion that the rule, as applied to Edenfield
v. Fane in the business context, violated the First Amendment.3 59
However, the Court found that the antisolicitation rule was designed
to promote ethical standards for accountants and did not generally
violate the First Amendment analysis.3 60
Finally, applying the third part of the Central Hudson analysis,
Justice O'Connor concluded that given the interests in promoting
professionalism and protecting against solicitation-type harms, the
restriction was reasonably proportional to the State's asserted interest
in protecting business persons, especially those with small
businesses.361  Hence, Justice O'Connor would defer to Florida's
choice on how to protect society and promote professionalism,
especially since the rule itself seems to meet the dictates of Central
Hudson. While not on board with the Court's majority, this
summation was the hook that Justice O'Connor used to "restrain [this]
logic within reasonable bounds" as she said in Shapero, which will be
discussed in Section VI.3 63
C O'Connor's Professionalism Ideal Reflected in Crininal Matters
There are three cases involving the role of lawyers in criminal
matters worth discussing. The first case reflects the critical protective
role the lawyer plays in our system of justice. The other two are
arguably under the umbrella of free speech because one concerns
speaking publicly about a client's case and the other concerns a
lawyer's ability to speak untruthfully on behalf of a client. All three
of these cases suggest that attorneys, while providing legal services to
clients, also have a larger duty to society, and thus are not solely in
3 5 8. Id.
359. Id. at 780. In reviewing the departure of the majority, Justice O'Connor states, "I
am surprised that the majority has taken this approach without explaining or even articulating
the underlying assumption: that a commercial speaker can claim First Amendment protection
for particular instances of commercial speech, even where the prohibitory law satisfies Central
Hudson." Id. See also id at 770-71 (majority opinion) (discussing the majority's approach).
360. Id. at 767, 771 (majority opinion).
361. Id. at 781 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
362. Id
363. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 480 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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service to those who pay the fee.
The first case, in which Justice O'Connor wrote the majority
opinion, is Strickland v. Washington.3 64 This case set the standard for
determining the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal matter. A defendant convicted of murder
appealed his death penalty sentence on the grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel, claiming that his lawyer failed to properly
present evidence that would have militated against the death
penalty.3 6 5 In evaluating that claim, Justice O'Connor laid out a two-
part test requiring that "[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. . .. [And second], the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."3 66 The
case is important because it demonstrates the crucial role counsel
plays in the justice system, especially when a person's life and liberty
are at stake. As to that role of effective assistance of counsel, Justice
O'Connor proclaimed, "In giving meaning to the requirement,
however, we must take its purpose to ensure a fair trial as the
guide."367  Justice O'Connor's goal was to ensure "fundamental
fairness" 3 6 8 in the system of law. 3 6 9 In other words, the law must
fully protect the rights of the individuals who are called to defend
themselves in court, and the lawyer's performance in that role must be
worthy of the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.3 70
The challenge of speaking for the client presents ethical and
practical issues for the attorney. First, consider the case of a lawyer
sanctioned for speaking on his client's behalf in Gentile v. State Bar
of Nevada.37 t  This is a noncommercial First Amendment case
involving the proper method for an attorney to make a public
statement about a client undergoing a criminal prosecution.3 72 During
their careers, attorneys are likely to have to defend a client in the
court of public opinion as well as in the court of law.
Correspondingly, prosecutors will also hold press conferences to
explain an ongoing criminal proceeding. The challenge for both sets
364. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
365. Id. at 675.
366. Id. at 687.
367. Id. at 686.
368. Id at 696.
369. Id
370. Id at 688.
371. Gentile v. State Bar ofNev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
372. Id. at 1048-49.
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of attorneys will be to present sufficient, truthful information about
the matter without unduly prejudicing the criminal defendant's right
to a fair trial. The difficulty comes in drafting a disciplinary rule with
precise parameters that permit free speech but inhibit overzealous
dialogue. The ABA has established the test for forbidding speech that
has a material likelihood of causing substantial material prejudice in
obtaining a fair trial.3 73
In Gentile, the attorney carefully attempted to stay within the
framework of the disciplinary rule, but was nonetheless sanctioned by
the Nevada State Bar.3 74 The Supreme Court, in a divided set of
opinions favoring the appealing lawyer, noted that the rule itself was
too vague as to what was permitted and what was proscribed.3 7 s
Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion agreeing with the
judgment of the court because the contested rule was too vague.376
For the purpose of further expounding on Justice O'Connor's
professionalism perspective, it is significant to highlight her thinking
about the public-service role of the lawyer. Justice O'Connor noted
that "[1]awyers are officers of the court and as such, may legitimately
be subject to ethical precepts that keep them from engaging in what
otherwise might be constitutionally protected speech."37 7  Justice
O'Connor's framework for analyzing free-speech issues is
accordingly grounded in the notion that lawyers, as professionals,
have duties that reflect their critical role in the justice system and in
preserving the rule of law. Hence, it is proper for state bars to place
constraints on the First Amendment rights of lawyers.3 7 8
Finally, consider the dilemma of the attorney who is asked to
speak untruthfully on behalf of a client or support the client's desire
to do so. In Nix v. Whiteside, a criminal defendant in a murder trial
sought to testify in his own defense by purposely creating a false
defense to the charge. 379 Upon informing his lawyer of his plan, the
lawyer strongly advised against the plan and informed the defendant
that if he lied on the stand, the lawyer would have to disclose the lie
373. See JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT'S GUIDE 876-78 (2012-2013 ed.).
374. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1050.
375. Id. at 1048.
376. Id. at 1082 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
377. Id. at 1081-82.
378. Id.
379. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1985).
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to the judge.380  The defendant was convicted of second-degree
murder and appealed his conviction on the grounds that he was denied
his right to testify in his own defense and he had ineffective assistance
of counsel.38 1
The United States Supreme Court found that the defendant's
constitutional rights had not been violated. First, the defendant did
not have the right to testify falsely on his own behalf 382 Second,
using the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington,383 the lawyer
acted within the reasonable range of appropriate conduct for handling
the proposed perjury, and did not prejudice the defendant's right to a
fair trial.3 84
Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote for the majority in Nix, and
was joined by Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Blackmum and Stevens,
who each authored concurring opinions.38 5  While they all agreed
with the result, the prevailing question among the concurring opinions
was whether the Chief Justice's opinion overstated the doctrinal basis
of the ruling by detailing the appropriate ethical standards and
methods of reconciling the attorney's various ethical duties in this
circumstance. 386 Justice Brennan suggested that while the Court's
extensive historical discussion and review of the ethical rules was
informative, the Court surpassed its authority by attempting to shape
ethical rules for states.387 Justice Blackmun found that the issue was
too complicated to provide a definitive answer for the appropriate
response to client-proposed perjury, given the eccentricities of each
case and taking into account a lawyer's duty of confidentiality,
380. Id. at 161.
381. Id at 162.
382. Id at 173.
383. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
384. Nix, 475 U.S. at 175.
385. Id at 177-91 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (Justices Marshall, Stevens, and Brennan
joined Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion).
386. Id at 169-71 (majority opinion).
387. Id at 176-77 (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court's sentiment
regarding the ethical duties of lawyers was mere dictum). Justice Brennan stated:
Unfortunately, the Court seems unable to resist the temptation of
sharing with the legal community its vision of ethical conduct. But let
there be no mistake: the Court's essay regarding what constitutes the
correct response to a criminal client's suggestion that he will perjure




loyalty, and candor to the tribunal.8 Justice Blackmun strongly
urged the court to defer to the individual states to establish the
appropriate ethical responsibilities of lawyers.8 Justice Stevens's
opinion mirrored this assessment and suggested that the underlying
question of a lawyer's proper ethical response to intended client
perjury had not been settled by the majority.39 0
The diversity of opinions found in Nix demonstrate the
challenges the Justices have in reviewing matters of professionalism.
The Justices' varying and often-competing philosophical perspectives
on professionalism and how much deference to give to the states in
setting ethical limits are the core challenges in structuring a
commercial free-speech doctrine in cases involving regulation
advertising and solicitation.
VI. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S PROFESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE TRIUMPHS
(BARELY) IN FLORIDA BAR V. WENTFOR IT, INC.
Motivated by a desire to "preserv[e] the legal profession as a
genuine profession," Justice O'Connor hoped the Court would effect
a cure to the misapplication of First Amendment principles
promulgated in Bates and the line of cases that followed.3 9 1 However,
in Floida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., Justice O'Connor applied the facts
to the prior case law enunciated in Bates and Central Hudson, thereby
validating the Florida regulatory system as being within the
previously established parameters of commercial free-speech
doctrine. 3 92  In essence, Justice O'Connor took her dissent in
Edenfield and applied the reasoning to this case. The arrival of
Justices Clarence Thomas (1991) and Stephen Breyer (1994) to the
bench, replacing Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun,
aided O'Connor's viewpoint as both Justices, along with Justice
Antonin Scalia and Chief Justice William Rehnquist, joined her
388. Id. at 188-89 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
389. Id. at 189 ("I therefore am troubled by the Court's implicit adoption of a set of
standards of professional responsibility for attorneys in state criminal proceedings. The States,
of course, do have a compelling interest in the integrity of their criminal trials that can justify
regulating the length to which an attorney may go in seeking his client's acquittal. But the
American Bar Association's implicit suggestion in its brief amicus curiae that the Court find
that the Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct should govern an attorney's
responsibilities is addressed to the wrong audience.").
390. Id. at 190-91 (Stevens, J., concurring).
391. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 491 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).




Justice O'Connor applied the three-part test articulated in Central
Hudson. First, she considered the stated harm that the regulation was
designed to redress and found the targeted and direct solicitation of
victims and their families after a tragic disaster was a serious breach
of their privacy at a uniquely vulnerable time of unspeakable grief.3 9 3
While the conduct of the lawyers is certainly condemnable, the State
was attempting to protect the public from this specific harm.3 94
Moreover, such solicitation harmed the reputation of the legal
profession in the public's eyes.3 9 5 From this position, the State had a
compelling interest in enacting the regulation.
Second, the regulation advanced this interest in protecting the
grieving public by shielding potential clients for a short reasonable
time, protecting their privacy in a time of grief.396 Further, the
regulation helped improve the poor image of lawyers in Florida by
"forestall[ing] the outrage and irritation with the state-licensed legal
profession that the practice of direct solicitation only days after
accidents has engendered."39 7
Third, the regulation met the Court's requirement of a reasonable
fit between the ends and the means chosen by the State to effectuate
those ends because it was narrowly drawn to allow direct-mail
solicitation after 30 days, thereby affording lawyers the opportunity to
convey otherwise protected communications to potential clients.398
The regulation did not prohibit lawyers from using other media, such
as television and radio advertising, to announce their availability for
providing legal services.3 9 9  While those affected by disasters may
face myriad legal issues, the solicitation ban did not disadvantage
393. Id. at 629-30 (noting Shapero's treatment of privacy was too casual and failed to
consider "the special dangers of overreaching inhering in targeted solicitations"); see id. at 630
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) ("The Bar has argued, and the record reflects, that a
principal purpose of the ban is 'protecting the personal privacy and tranquility of [Florida's]
citizens from crass commercial intrusion by attorneys upon their personal grief in times of
trauma."'(quoting Brief for Petitioner at 8, Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 630
(1995) (no. 94-226))).
394. Id. at 630.
395. Id. at 625.
396. Id. at 633.
397. Id. at 631.
398. Id. at 632-33 ("The Bar's rule is reasonably well tailored to its stated objective of
eliminating targeted mailings whose type and timing are a source of distress to Floridians,
distress that has caused many of them to lose respect for the legal profession.").
399. Id at 633-34.
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persons coping with the immediate aftermath of a disaster by
preventing them from obtaining legal aid.400
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy applied the three-prong Central
Hudson test and reached a much different conclusion.4 0 1 Justice
Kennedy argued that the State had not articulated a significant
governmental interest under the first prong, especially in light of the
Shapero holding, which permitted targeted mailings.0 2 The mode of
communication, a mailing, did not present the same danger as the in-
person client solicitation that was prohibited in Ohralik.403  Justice
Kennedy argued that the mere possibly of the mailed advertisement
offending a potential client was not a sufficient reason to place a ban
on this expression of information.4 0 4 Finally, Justice Kennedy
asserted that while the State's interest in protecting the profession's
reputation is legitimate, allowing lawyers to disseminate information
to potential clients on how the legal system may help them could be
beneficial to the public. 4 0 5 He noted:
The fact is, however, that direct solicitation may
serve vital purposes and promote the administration of
justice, and to the extent the bar seeks to protect
lawyers' reputations by preventing them from
engaging in speech some deem offensive, the State is
doing nothing more than manipulating the public's
opinion by suppressing speech that informs us how
the legal system works. 06
As to the second prong of the analysis, Justice Kennedy believed
that there was no substantial government interest to advance and little
400. Id at 634 ("Floridians have little difficulty finding a lawyer when they need one.").
401. Id. at 635-36 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
402. Id. at 637 (citations omitted) ("The problem the Court confronts, and cannot
overcome, is our recent decision in [Shapero]. In assessing the importance of the interest in
that solicitation case, we made an explicit distinction between direct, in-person solicitations
and direct-mail solicitations. Shapero, like this case, involved a direct-mail solicitation, and
there the State recited its fears of 'overreaching and undue influence.' We found, however, no
such dangers presented by direct-mail advertising.").
403. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 467 (1978) (holding a lawyer's
direct, in-person solicitation of personal-injury business may be prohibited by the State).
404. Went ForIt, 515 U.S. at 638 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).




credible evidence that actual harm was occurring.4 07 Therefore, under
the third prong, Justice Kennedy concluded, "the relationship between
the Bar's interests and the means chosen to serve them is not a
reasonable fit." 40 8 The regulation was overbroad, covering potential
clients who might wish to learn of the availability of a lawyer's
services.4 0 9 In that situation, a client may be delayed in receiving
information necessary to protecting important legal rights.410  The
bottom line for Justice Kennedy was that direct-mail solicitation
works, and clients should be given every avenue to receive
information. He concluded that "[t]he use of modem communication
methods in a timely way is essential if clients who make up this vast
demand are to be advised and informed of all of their choices and
rights in selecting an attorney."4 1'
As these two approaches suggest, this case carries with it the
same tensions and issues involved in the Bates case discussed in
Section III. Justice O'Connor's opinion and the dissenting opinion of
Justice Kennedy illustrate the differing viewpoints on the First
Amendment, the factual supports for regulations, and the
philosophical differences about the role of the Court in reviewing
state regulation of professionalism, specifically attorney conduct in
advertising and solicitation. These tensions were woven into the
analysis that each Justice used when considering Florida's targeted-
mailing rules.
Justice O'Connor's First Amendment analysis was premised on
the belief that commercial free speech, while important, is not in the
same classification as political speech.4 12 She noted that "[s]uch First
Amendment protection, of course, is not absolute. [The Court has]
always been careful to distinguish commercial speech from speech at
the First Amendment's core."4 13 This view is consistent with her
writings on the First Amendment in The Majesty of the Law,
407. Id. at 641 ("Our cases require something more than a few pages of self-serving and
unsupported statements by the State to demonstrate that a regulation directly and materially
advances the elimination of a real harm when the State seeks to suppress truthful and non-
deceptive speech.").
408. Id. at 641.
409. Id. at 643-44.
410. Id. at 643.
411. Id. at 644.
412. Id. at 623 (majority opinion) ("Such First Amendment protection, of course, is not





discussed earlier. Justice O'Connor emphasized that the Court should
follow Central Hudson by utilizing regulations under mid-level
scrutiny, a standard of review that is generally used for fundamental
rights such as political free speech and expression.414
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy did not support Justice
O'Connor's proposed cure to Bates. He vehemently disagreed with
any retreat from established First Amendment principles.415 One
could read Justice Kennedy's dissent to argue that free speech of any
kind should be given the highest level of protection:
It would oversimplify to say that what we
consider here is commercial speech and nothing more,
for in many instances the banned communications
may be vital to the recipients' right to petition the
courts for redress of grievances. The complex nature
of expression is one reason why even so-called
commercial speech has become an essential part of the
public discourse the First Amendment secures.416
For Justice Kennedy, this reasoning is based on the point of view
that clients have a right to receive this type of information because it
is vital to protecting their legal rights.417 Furthermore, Justice
Kennedy viewed the regulation as government censorship, a
proposition that the majority of the Court's prior First Amendment
cases do not countenance.418
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy also read the facts differently
and emphasized different studies on which they based their opinion.
Justice O'Connor found the Bar's extensive study sufficient to
establish the factual basis of the government's substantial interest in
414. Id. at 623-24.
415. Id. at 635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) ("Attorneys who
communicate their willingness to assist potential clients are engaged in speech protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. That principle has been understood since [Bates]. The
Court today undercuts this guarantee in an important class of cases and unsettles leading First
Amendment precedents, at the expense of those victims most in need of legal assistance.").
416. Id. at 636.
417. Id at 643.
418. Id at 645 ("The Court's opinion reflects a new-found and illegitimate confidence
that it, along with the Supreme Court of Florida, knows what is best for the Bar and its clients.
Self-assurance has always been the hallmark of a censor. That is why under the First
Amendment the public, not the State, has the right and the power to decide what ideas and
information are deserving of their adherence.").
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regulating direct-mail solicitation.419 Justice O'Connor incorporated
into her discussion other precedents that seemingly weaken the
State's position. First, she distinguished Edenfield, which rejected a
Florida restriction on accountants' direct targeted mailings, by
suggesting that in that instance the State failed to articulate a
cognizable harm.4 2 0  Here the harm to the public was adequately
demonstrated. Then Justice O'Connor distinguished Shapero as a
case that did not provide sufficient evidentiary basis for
demonstrating the harm that the State had an interest in preventing.4 2'
In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., there was significant, unrefuted
evidence not only to validate a finding of harm but also to undergird
the regulatory scheme that was designed to eliminate the harm.4 22 By
using this strategic approach, she followed precedent and attempted to
"effect a worthwhile cure" to Bates.
Justice Kennedy used the same constitutional jurisprudence,
applying the commercial free-speech test of Central Hudson as Justice
O'Connor.4 2 3 For Justice Kennedy, there was little evidence that
direct-mail advertising was a harm from which the public needed
protection in a manner that suppressed free speech.4 24 He found that
the documents were inadequate because they were not descriptive
enough, were incompetently prepared, and were statistically
suspect.42 5 Moreover, the State had not demonstrated that unsolicited,
direct mailings to potential clients "would be unwelcome or
unnecessary when the survivors or the victim must at once begin
419. Id. at 626 (majority opinion) ("The Bar submitted a 106-page summary of its 2-year
study of lawyer advertising and solicitation to the District Court. That summary contains
data-both statistical and anecdotal-supporting the Bar's contentions that the Florida public
views direct-mail solicitations in the immediate wake of accidents as an intrusion on privacy
that reflects poorly upon the profession.").
420. Id.
421. Id. at 629.
422. Id. at 628.
423. Id. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
424. Id. at 641 (disagreeing with the majority's rationale of protecting the public).
Justice Kennedy stated:
It is telling that the essential thrust of all the material adduced to
justify the state's interest is devoted to the reputational concerns of the
Bar. It is not at all clear that this regulation advances the interest of
protecting persons who are suffering trauma and grief, and we are cited to
no material in the record for that claim.
Id.
425. Id at 640-41.
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assessing their legal and financial position in a rational manner."4 2 6
Finally, Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy each concluded
their opinions with a philosophical statement about the Court's role in
setting standards of professionalism. Justice O'Connor re-
emphasized her belief that while commercial speech has
constitutional protection, it does not rise to the same level as a
traditional free-speech analysis. This is especially true regarding
attorneys "because the standards and conduct of state-licensed
lawyers have traditionally been subject to extensive regulation by the
States."42 7  Direct-mail solicitation at a vulnerable time is
unprofessional conduct and promotes "the erosion of confidence that
such repeated invasions have engendered."42 8 Justice O'Connor had
the vision that a learned profession should always uphold its unique
public obligations to the extent practicable, as the discussion in
Section I suggests.
Justice Kennedy placed the emphasis on the First Amendment
rights of both the lawyer to disseminate information and the client to
receive that information.4 29 Moreover, Justice Kennedy did not agree
with the proposition that the Court could shape the discourse on
professionalism because "it amounts to mere sermonizing."4 30
Protecting and promoting the dignity of the profession was not a
judicial role, at least as far as constitutional doctrine was
concerned.431
In the end, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. raises more
questions than answers, just like where the Court began in Bates.
Under the First Amendment's commercial free-speech doctrine, how
much protection should be provided to attorneys who wish to inform
the public of their availability and willingness to provide legal
services for a fee? When measuring and evaluating any harm caused
by lawyers when they advertise or solicit clients, how should the
Court weigh any factual evidence to determine the extent of the
426. Id. at 642.
427. Id. at 635 (majority opinion).
428. Id
429. Id at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
430. Id. at 645.
431. Id. (noting the State cannot improve the profession's image "by suppressing
information about the profession's business aspects"). Justice Kennedy stated, "If public
respect for the profession erodes because solicitation distorts the idea of the law as most
lawyers see it, it must be remembered that real progress begins with more rational speech, not
less." Id.
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government's legitimate interest? From a philosophical perspective,
what is the role, if any, that the Court should play in setting
professional standards that the states claim to be in their exclusive
domains? And finally, is this a task for which the Court should defer
to the states?
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Just as society was rapidly changing when Justice O'Connor
entered the legal profession, our world seems to be changing even
faster. The past thirty years have witnessed the dawning of the
computer age and the subsequent evolution of the Internet, which
instantly places information at the public's fingertips. Technology
has advanced so quickly that people are developing new devices and
computer applications almost daily. Lawyers use websites and a
variety of social media to market their law practices.4 32
Consequently, the concept of advertising and solicitation are thus
placed under the general rubric of marketing, a necessary skill if a
lawyer wishes to attract potential clients.433
With new methods and means of marketing legal services, there
is a need to continually update how the ethics rules are applied to
these means of advertising and soliciting clients. Author Helen
Gunnarsson covers many of the current concerns in a two-part Special
Report for the ABA/BNA Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct
which surveys many of the Internet mediums for marketing legal
services.434 In the first report, Gunnarsson explores how state bars and
432. See generally Stephanie Francis Ward, Fifty Simple Ways You Can Market Your
Practice, A.B.A. J., July 2013 (general suggestions for marketing a legal practice with specific
tips on social-media marketing).
433. NELSON P. MILLER ET AL., ENTREPRENEURIAL PRACTICE: ENTERPRISE SKILLS
FOR SERVING EMERGING CLIENT POPULATIONS 25-26 (2012) ("Marketing is certainly a
legitimate concern of lawyers and law firms, even though appropriately colored by the
profession's special commitment to law and justice through client service. Lawyers constantly
think and talk about marketing, and adopt marketing practices, even while they also keep their
figurative eye on the professional ball. Marketing is an important and legitimate concern
simply because it addresses how lawyers create and deliver law products and services for
specific client segments. Marketing principles can therefor legitimately guide lawyer practice.
Marketing activities are legitimate means of increasing the positive professional influences and
reach of a lawyer's services.").
434. Helen W. Gunnarsson, Special Report, Ethics Standards on Lawyer Advertising
Apply to Content on Firms' Websites, 30 Law. Manual Prof. Conduct 112 (2014) [hereinafter
Gunnarsson, Ethics Standards on Firms' Websites]; Helen W. Gunnarsson, Special Report,
When Lawyers Use Others' Websites for Marketing, Ethics Rules Follow Them, 30 Law.
Manual Prof. Conduct 151 (2014) [hereinafter, Gunnarsson, Ethics Rules Follow].
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the ABA have attempted to craft rules that cover the multitude of
issues surrounding the content of advertising on law firm websites,
including hyperlinks to and from other websites.43 In the second
report, Gunnarsson tackles a wide variety of advertising and
solicitation issues including lawyer-rating websites, Groupon offers,
listing specializations, targeted electronic messages, forms of direct-
contact chat rooms, live legal-answer sessions, and e-mail
* * 436solicitation.
Both reports demonstrate a variety of approaches in terms of
ethical regulations, but all seem to follow the general framework
developed during Justice O'Connor's time on the Court. Gunnarsson
notes that website advertising must not be false, deceptive, or
misleading, and must "include qualifying statements or disclaimers to
avoid unjustified expectations by potential clients; cautionary
statements may be drafted to effectively limit or disclaim lawyer's
obligations to website visitors."4 3 7 Some marketing methods create
unique challenges, such as participating on a website like Groupon or
other sites that offer coupon deals that potential clients can purchase
in advance.4 38 For example, when the lawyer receives the payments
from the coupon-service provider, should they be placed in the
lawyer's trust account, are they refundable, and does the fee charged
by the coupon website amount to sharing fees with a nonlawyer?
Sending text messages, while arguably done in real time, is not unlike
direct-mail solicitation that must be designated as "Advertising
Materials" according to some ethics opinions.43 9  Gunnarsson's
extensive review of current ethics opinions and law-review articles
demonstrates that the basic framework of analysis under the ethics
rules continues to be adapted to the new mediums of advertising and
solicitation, although with varying outcomes.
From a First Amendment-doctrinal perspective, the analysis of
Bates and its progeny, including Central Hudson and Went For It,
continues to be applied to the various mediums of marketing. For
example, the Florida State Bar has made several efforts to draft rules
435. Gunnarsson, Ethics Standards on Firms' Websites, supra note 434.
436. Gunnarsson, Ethics Rules Follow, supra note 434.
437. Gunnarsson, Ethics Standards on Firms' Websites, supra note 434 (citing ABA
Comm'n on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-457 (2010) (discussing advertising
on lawyer websites).




for advertising that would pass constitutional muster.440 Of the many
provisions and guidelines developed to regulate advertising, one
provision spoke to listing past results as being "deceptive and
inherently misleading."4 41 The rule was challenged on First
Amendment grounds by attorney Robert Rubenstein and his law firm
Rubenstein Law, P.A., who had developed a television advertising
campaign.4 42 After obtaining prior approval from the Florida Bar's
Regulation Department, Rubenstein was notified that his
advertisement was not in compliance with the ethics rules. However,
he continued to run the ads and the Bar began disciplinary
proceedings against him. He challenged the rule on First Amendment
grounds and sought summary judgment in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida.443
United States District Court Judge Beth Bloom found that this
was a commercial free-speech case and met the procedural
requirements for summary judgment.4 44 She reviewed the Supreme
Court cases with which Justice O'Connor wrestled and concluded that
the proper analysis to apply would be the three-part test of Central
Hudson as applied in Went For It. 4 4 5 Judge Bloom found that there
were substantial government interests at stake, including "[protecting]
the public from misleading or deceptive attorney advertising;
[promoting] advertising that is positively informative to potential
clients; and [preventing] attorney advertising that contributes to
disrespect for the legal system and thereby degrades the
administration of justice."44 6 On the second prong of the Central
440. See In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar-Subchapter 4-7,
Lawyer Advert. Rules, 108 So. 3d 609 (Fla. 2013) [hereinafter Amendments to Subehapter 4-
7]; see also In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar-Advert., 971 So. 2d 763
(Fla. 2007); Fla. Bar v. Pape, 918 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 2005) (reviewing whether a lawyer could
use advertising that characterized the lawyer as a "pit bull" and determining the advertisement
violated advertising rules).
441. Amendments to Subehapter 4-7, supra note 440, at 618-19.
442. Rubenstein v. Fla. Bar, 72 F. Supp. 3d 1298, 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (alteration in
original) ("Plaintiffs' advertisements include, for example, a television segment animated with
a cartoon car accident, a courthouse and dollar signs drawn on a dry-erase board; using an
attorney voice over; and depicting the words "COLLECTED OVER $50 MILLION FOR
THEIR CLIENTS IN JUST THE LAST YEAR! Gross proceeds. Results in individual cases
are based on the unique facts of each case.").
443. Id. at 1301.
444. Id. at 1308.
445. Id. at 1310-12; see also Harrell v. Fla. Bar, 608 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2010)
(applying the test used for commercial speech to Florida attorney-advertising case).
446. Rubenstein, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 1314-15.
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Hudson test, Judge Bloom found no evidence "that the restrictions
[the State had] imposed on the use of past results in attorney
advertisement support the interests its Rules were designed to
promote."4 4 7 Finally, the ethics rules failed the third prong of Central
Hudson by not being narrowly tailored to achieve the intended
results.448  The court found the rules to be "unconstitutional in
violation of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution."4 4 9 Judge Bloom followed the script Justice O'Connor
wrote in Went For It, and perhaps came to a conclusion that was more
in line with the dissent in that case.
The continuing challenge of Bates and the dilemma of
professionalism in light of the right to advertise one's services as a
lawyer is the long-standing tension between the morals of the
marketplace and the morals of the profession. Konefshy and Sullivan
explore this in their article by considering the fear in the profession
about the current state of legal education and how the practice of law
has suffered contractions and restructuring in how the profession
delivers legal services since the Great Recession of 2009.4o At the
base is the question of what it means to be a lawyer. The economics
of the marketplace only partially determine the answer because
lawyers by necessity must utilize contemporary means of marketing
their legal services.
There are many ways to consider the historical significance of
the Bates case notwithstanding the harsh criticism by Justice
O'Connor. Although attorneys Bates and O'Steen are products of the
rapid social, cultural, economic and technological changes in society,
they are also cognizant of the emerging constitutional doctrines that
permit wider expressions of ideas, politically and economically.
Justice O'Connor reminds us that being a lawyer in our society
comes with special duties and responsibilities. The core of her belief,
as articulated in The Majesty of the Law, is that lawyers have a
unique calling to protect the rule of law and to offer access to those
whose legal rights are in jeopardy.4 5 1 In an era of crass
commercialism, as evidenced by some lawyers' advertisements on
447. Id. at 1304, 1315.
448. Id. at 1317-18.
449. Id at 1322 (emphasis in original).
450. See Alfred S. Konefsky & Barry Sullivan, In This Winter ofourDiscontent: Legal
Practice, Legal Education, and the Culture ofDistrust, 62 BUFF. L. REv. 659 (2014).
451. See O'CONNOR, MAJESTY, supra note 9.
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late-night television, she calls lawyers back to the ideal of service.
Ultimately, being a true professional in the tradition of lawyers past
should have vibrant currency to all who are privileged to practice law
in all of its majesty.
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